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セキュアRFIDタグチップの設計論
三上　修吾
論文概要
本論文では RFIDタグに着目し，暗号アルゴリズムを用いた認証プロトコルを実行可能な，セ
キュアな RFID タグの設計，実装と性能評価を行う．認証プロトコルを実行するためには，
暗号アルゴリズムと擬似乱数生成器を RFID タグに実装することが求められる．セキュアな
RFIDタグを実現するため，(A)認証プロトコルの実装アーキテクチャの決定，(B)暗号アルゴ
リズムの選定，(C)擬似乱数生成手法の確立，(D) RFIDシステムでのシリコンチップの性能評
価，に分けて取り組んだ．
本論文では，まず (A)について述べる．認証プロトコルを実行するには，認証の度，暗号ア
ルゴリズムと擬似乱数生成器を複数回動作させる必要がある．そのため，暗号処理にかかる時
間が RFIDタグの実装性能に与える影響は大きいと考えられる．これまでの研究では，回路面
積が小さいことが求められてきたが，RFIDタグ向けには処理時間の観点から実装アーキテク
チャを検討する必要がある．そこで本論文では，認証プロトコルに適した実装アーキテクチャ
を検討し，処理時間の評価を行う．評価を通して，認証プロトコルで広く利用されるハッシュ
関数には，パラレルアーキテクチャが適していることを述べる．
次に，(B)について述べる．これまでの研究で，多数の暗号アルゴリズムが提案されており，
暗号アルゴリズムごとに回路単体の実装性能が評価されてきた．しかし，実装性能は評価環境
によって異なるため，実装性能の比較評価が困難という問題があった．さらに，RFIDタグ向
けのインターフェースを意識した実装はされていなかった．そこで本論文では，RFIDタグ向
けのインターフェースを備えた実装を行い，同一の評価環境を用いて暗号アルゴリズムの実
装性能の評価を行う．評価結果にもとづき，RFIDタグに適した暗号アルゴリズムについて述
べる．
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次に，(C)について述べる．RFIDタグで擬似乱数を生成する一方策として，(B)の結果を踏
まえた擬似乱数生成器の実装が考えられる．一方で，認証プロトコルでは，暗号アルゴリズム
と擬似乱数生成器を同時に使用することはないため，暗号アルゴリズムを擬似乱数生成用途に
も利用できれば，RFIDタグのハードウェアリソースを有効に活用することが可能となる．そ
こで本論文では，RFID認証プロトコルで使用されるハッシュ関数を用いた擬似乱数生成手法
を提案し，乱数性の評価を行う．評価を通して，軽量な擬似乱数生成手法を確立し，本手法の
有効性を述べる．
次に，(D)について述べる．これまでの研究において，暗号アルゴリズムを用いた RFIDタ
グ認証プロトコルは提案されてきた．しかし，認証プロトコルを実行する RFIDタグ全体の実
装と性能評価はされてこなかった．そこで本論文では，アナログフロントエンドと (A)(B)(C)
の結果を含むデジタル処理回路をシングルチップで実装し，RFIDタグの実装性能の評価を行
う．評価を通して，暗号アルゴリズムを用いた認証プロトコルを実行する，セキュアな RFID
タグは実現可能であることを実証する．
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DESIGN METHODOLOGY OF SECURE RFID TAG
IMPLEMENTATION
SHUGO MIKAMI
ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we focus on radio frequency identification (RFID) tag. We design, implement,
and evaluate hardware performance of a secure tag that runs the authentication protocol based on
cryptographic algorithms. The cryptographic algorithm and the pseudorandom number generator
are required to be implemented in the tag. To realize the secure tag, we tackle the following four
steps: (A) decision of hardware architecture for the authentication protocol, (B) selection of the
cryptographic algorithm, (C) establishment of a pseudorandom number generating method, and
(D) implementation and performance evaluation of a silicon chip on an RFID system.
(A) The cryptographic algorithm and the pseudorandom number generator are repeatedly called
for each authentication. Therefore, the impact of the time needed for the cryptographic processes
on the hardware performance of the tag can be large. While low-area requirements have been
mainly discussed in the previous studies, it is needed to discuss the hardware architecture for the
authentication protocol from the viewpoint of the operating time. In this thesis, in order to decide
the hardware architecture, we evaluate hardware performance in the sense of the operating time.
As a result, the parallel architecture is suitable for hash functions that are widely used for tag
authentication protocols.
(B) A lot of cryptographic algorithms have been developed and hardware performance of the
algorithms have been evaluated on dierent conditions. However, as the evaluation results depend
on the conditions, it is hard to compare the previous results. In addition, the interface of the
cryptographic circuits has not been paid attention. In this thesis, in order to select a cryptographic
algorithm, we design the interface of the cryptographic circuits to meet with the tag, and evaluate
hardware performance of the circuits on the same condition. As a result, the lightweight hash
function SPONGENT-160 achieves well-balanced hardware performance.
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(C) Implementation of a pseudorandom number generator based on the performance evaluation
results on (B) can be a method to generate pseudorandom number on the tag. On the other hand, as
the cryptographic algorithm and the pseudorandom number generator are not used simultaneously
on the authentication protocol. Therefore, if the cryptographic circuit could be used for pseudo-
random number generation, the hardware resource on the tag can be exploited eciently. In this
thesis, we propose a pseudorandom number generating method using a hash function that is a
cryptographic component of the authentication protocol. Through the evaluation of our proposed
method, we establish a lightweight pseudorandom number generating method for the tag.
(D) Tag authentication protocols using a cryptographic algorithm have been developed in the
previous studies. However, hardware implementation and performance evaluation of a tag, which
runs authentication processes, have not been studied. In this thesis, we design and do a single chip
implementation of an analog front-end block and a digital processing block including the results
on (A), (B), and (C). Then, we evaluate hardware performance of the tag. As a result, we show
that a tag, which runs the authentication protocol based on cryptographic algorithms, is feasible.
– xi –

Contents
Part I Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Research Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Motivation and Contribution of This Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Towards Future Research Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Structure of This Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Part II RFID and Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithms 21
Chapter 2 RFID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.1 LF Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.2 HF Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3 UHF Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 RFID Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 EPCGlobal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 ISO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 RFID Reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Backend System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6 Security and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.1 Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.2 Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
– xiii –
Chapter 3 Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Symmetric Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.1 Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.2 Stream Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.3 Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1 Grain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.2 Trivium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.3 Enocoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.4 SPONGENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.5 PHOTON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.6 QUARK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Implementation Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.1 FPGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.2 ASIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Comparison Metrics for Hardware Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5.1 Area Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5.2 Operating Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5.3 Power Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Part III Selection and Implementation of Cryptographic Components 53
Chapter 4 Hardware Architecture of Cryptographic Algorithm for RFID Tag . . . . . 55
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Basic Hardware Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.1 Parallel Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.2 Serialized Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.3 Sequential Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.3.1 Power Reduction Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
– xiv –
4.2.3.2 Sequential Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 Hardware Architecture of Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.1 Hardware Architecture for Lightweight Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.2 Hardware Architecture for Lightweight Stream Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Chapter 5 Selection of Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2 Design of Interface for Cryptographic Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2.1 Overview of RFID Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2.2 Interface of the Cryptographic Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3 Implementation of the Lightweight Stream Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3.1 Grain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3.1.1 Parallel Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3.1.2 Sequential Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3.2 Trivium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.2.1 Parallel Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.2.2 Sequential Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.3.3 Enocoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3.3.1 Parallel Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3.3.2 Sequential Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Implementation of the Lightweight Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.1 SPONGENT-160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.2 D-QUARK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.4.3 PHOTON-160/36/36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.4 Keccak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.5 Hardware Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.5.1 Performance Evaluation on FPGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.5.2 Performance Evaluation on ASIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
– xv –
5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Part IV Design of Lightweight Pseudorandom Number Generator 85
Chapter 6 Lightweight Pseudorandum Number Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2 Proposed Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3.1 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3.1.1 NIST Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3.1.2 Diehard Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.3.2 Data Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.3.3 Evaluation Results on NIST Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.3.4 Evaluation Results on Diehard Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.3.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.3.6 Area Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Part V Design and Evaluation of Secure RFID Tag 99
Chapter 7 Fully Integrated Passive UHF RFID Tag for Hash-Based Mutual Authenti-
cation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.2 Specification of a Fully Integrated Passive Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.2.2 Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.2.3 Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.2.3.1 SRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.2.3.2 EEPROM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.2.4 Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
– xvi –
7.2.5 Hardware Architecture of SPONGENT-160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.2.6 Hardware Architecture of Keccak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.3 Hardware Evaluation Using the Actual Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.3.1 Cost Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.3.2 Speed Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.3.3 Power Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.3.3.1 Simulated Power Consumption after Layout . . . . . . . 114
7.3.3.2 Power Consumption of the Chip with RF-based Power
Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.3.4 Communication Distance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.4.1 Impact of Non-Volatile Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.4.2 Usability of FPGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.4.3 Impact of Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Part VI Conclusion 123
Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks and Future Research Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
– xvii –
References 129
Paper Reuse Permission 140
Acknowledgments 143
List of Publications Related and Referred to the Thesis 147
List of All Publications 148
Author Biography 151
– xviii –
Notations
jj Concatenation of two bit sequences
<<< n Left cyclic n bit shift
GF(2n)　 Galois field
+;, XOR EXclusive OR operation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
DES Data Encryption Standard
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
EPC Electric Product Code
FF Flip Flop
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
FRAM Ferroelectric Random Access Memory
GE Gate Equivalent
HDL Hardware Description Language
HF High Frequency
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
– xix –
IV Initial Vector
LF Low Frequency
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register
LUT LookUp Tables
MUX MUltipleXer
NFSR Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PRNG PseudoRandom Number Generator
RF Radio Frequency
RFID Radio Frequency IDentification
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
UHF Ultra High Frequency
VCD Value Change Dump
– xx –
Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Background
Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the hottest topics in the field of information technology. IoT
is an integration of several technologies to connect the physical world and the cyber world. In
IoT system, many dierent kinds of devices are connected to the Internet. For example, physical
objects, such as vehicles, home appliances, and consumer electronics are connected to the Internet.
In [67], it is predicted that more than 50 billion devices will be connected to the Internet by
2020. The application areas of these devices are environmental monitoring, weather forecasting,
transportation, health care and so on. People can monitor and control the objects from a distance
via the Internet. For example, people can monitor and control the status of door safety at home and
vehicles remotely. Moreover, smart community and smart energy systems can be realized by IoT
systems. From the viewpoint of the economical perspective, both suppliers and consumers take
benefit of IoT. The consumers will be able to save money by utilizing smart energy. They will have
eective security such as vehicle alarm that informs unauthorized process. The suppliers will have
business chance to produce smart devices and technology that increase customer’s satisfaction.
In IoT system, Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tag is a key device to collect the physical
data. The tags are attached to millions of objects such as consumer devices, and books. When the
objects, which are used in our daily life, are equipped with tags, the objects are easily identified.
In addition, a tag is useful for health monitoring applications.
– 3 –
An RFID system mainly consists of tags and a reader. The tag is a small electric device in-
cluding an integrated circuit, a memory device, and an antenna. The tag is able to communicate
wirelessly with the reader. A usual tag has a unique number and the number is used for identifi-
cation of the tag. The identification is processed via the wireless communication.
RFID tags are mainly categorized into three types according to the RF, i.e. Low Frequency (LF)
tag, High Frequency (HF) tag, and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) tag. LF tag operates at 125 kHz
to 134 kHz. HF tag operates at 13.56 MHz. UHF tag operates at 865 MHz to 867 MHz in Europe,
and at 902 MHz to 928 MHz in the US. While the range of the UHF band was dierent according
to the countries, the range of UHF band has been unified. For example, in Japan, 920 MHz band
is assigned in the UHF band. Table 1.1 shows general tag’s caracteristics.
Table 1.1 RF and tag’s caracteristics
RF Low  ! High
Size of antenna Large  ! Small
Flexibility of antenna Low  ! High
Maximum read distance Short  ! Long
According to the report [56], as shown in Table 1.2, RFID market is growing year by year. In
Table 1.2 RFID market
Year 2013 2014 2015 2020
Market ($ billion) 8.8 9.5 10.1 13.2
the report, it is described that the most growing area is UHF RFID tags.
However, there is a concern of counterfeiting of the tag. Since the unique number is constant
and the tag sends the unique number to the reader wirelessly, it is easy for an attacker to eavesdrop
the tag’s response, and to resend it in another time. Therefore, tag authentication is required to
prevent the counterfeiting. A widely used authentication protocol is the challenge and response
protocol. It is assumed that the tag and the reader share the cryptographic function f and the secret
key K. Figure. 1.1 shows the challenge and response protocol.
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Figure. 1.1 Challenge and response protocol
While the above mentioned protocol removes the risk of the counterfeiting of the tag, the pri-
vacy issue is still remained. When an attacker sends the same C to the tag repeatedly, the tag
returns the same R. Therefore, it is easy for the attacker to trace the tag’s response by sending the
same C. Thus, the location of the tag or tag’s owner can be easily tracked.
Based on this background, countermeasure techniques against the security and the privacy risks
have been studied. One of the techniques is based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).
PUFs exploit inherent physical characteristics of the circuit or the device. Since the output of
the PUF is unique, PUF-based RFID tags have been studied. The tag generates a response from
the output of the PUF. A merit of the PUF-based RFID tag is that the tag does not hold the
secret key in the memory. However, Berker has pointed out that the PUF-based RFID tag, which
includes 4-way Arbiter PUF, can be easily attacked using machine learning [11]. The author
focuses on a reader that can emulate the tag. The attacker needs to hold the reader to collect the
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data communicated between the tag and the reader. Then, the PUF parameter can be reconstructed
by software model.
Another technique based on PUFs is PUF-based tag authentication protocol. For example, Aysu
et al. have proposed a PUF-based tag authentication protocol [5]. The Static Random Access
Memory (SRAM) PUF in the tag is used to generate the secret key needed for authentication. To
realize the protocol, it is required to implement SRAM PUF, SRAM random number generator,
a pseudorandom function, a fuzzy extractor based on BCH error correcting code, and a strong
extractor in the tag. The area requirements of the circuit are 3543 Lookup Tables (LUTs) when
Xilinx Virtex5 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is used for performance evaluations. In
addition, 2 Mbit SRAM is designated for the PUF. When we assume that a tag runs the challenge
and response protocol based on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the area requirements of
AES are 400 LUTs on Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA [22]. Thus, we deduce that this protocol requires a
lot of hardware resources for a tag.
The other technique is tag authentication protocol using a cryptographic algorithm. OMHSO
protocol is based on the challenge and response protocol and the hash chain [55]. The secret key is
updated with the output of the hash function every time after the challenge and response sequences
are succeeded. This protocol consists of cryptographic components, such as a pseudorandom
number generator and hash functions. These cryptographic components should be implemented
in the tag.
OMHSO protocol
OMHSO protocol is proposed by Hanatani et al. in 2011. This protocol, which is an improved
version of OSK protocol [88][89], is a mutual authentication protocol between the tag and the
server. The desynchronization issue caused by a communication error is solved by the mutual
authentication scheme using two secret keys that are the current secret key S i and previous secret
key S i 1. We show the process of the server in Algorithm. 1.1 and the process of the tag in
Algorithm. 1.2. S i and S i 1 are shared with the server. X and  are random numbers generated by
the server and the tag, respectively. H0, H1, and H2 are hash functions.
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Algorithm. 1.1 Authentication process of the server
Input: the current secret key S i, the previous secret key S i 1, tag’s response Y
Output: random number X, server’s response Z
1: Generate X.
2: Send X to the tag.
3: Wait until Y arrives to the server.
4: Parse Y as jj.
5: Compute 1 = H0(S i; X; ).
6: Compute 2 = H0(S i 1; X; ).
7: if  = 1 then
8: Compute Z = H1(S i; X; ).
9: else if  = 2 then
10: Compute Z = H1(S i 1; X; ).
11: else
12: Compute Z = random number.
13: end if
14: Send Z to the tag.
15: if  = 1 then
16: Compute S i+1 = H2(S i).
17: end if
Lightweight cryptographic algorithm
At the protocol layer, OMHSO protocol overcomes the security and privacy issue of the tag.
However, it is not clear how to realize the tag, which runs OMHSO protocol, at the algorithm
layer and at the implementation layer. To tackle this issue, studies from two directions have
been performed. One is development of cryptographic algorithm that is suitable for devices with
constrained resources.
Traditional cryptographic algorithms have been designed for platforms, which include desk-
top pc or server, having rich computing resources. However, these cryptographic algorithms are
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Algorithm. 1.2 Authentication process of the tag
Input: the current secret key S i, random number X, server’s response Z
Output: tag’s response Y
1: Wait until X arrives to the tag.
2: Generate .
3: Compute  = H0(S i; X; ).
4: Generate Y = jj.
5: Send Y to the server.
6: Wait until Z arrives to the tag.
7: Compute Z0 = H1(S i; X; ).
8: if Z0 = Z then
9: Compute S i+1 = H2(S i).
10: end if
not suitable for the specific devices with extremely constrained resources. These problems have
opened up a research area called lightweight cryptography. Lightweight cryptographic algorithms
are designed to be suited for resource constrained environments. eSTREAM project has encour-
aged developing lightweight stream ciphers [33]. A portfolio profile2 of the project, i.e. Grain
has been referred in many studies [53][54][7]. Another portfolio profile2 of the project, i.e. Triv-
ium has been adopted as an ISO/IEC 29192-3 standard [25][26] as well as Enocoro developed
by Hitachi, Ltd [50]. Lightweight hash functions, such as SPONGENT [19][20], QUARK [3][6],
and PHOTON [48] have been developed and International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
standardizing is working.
Implementation of cryptographic components
The other is implementation and evaluation of hardware performance of the cryptographic module
or digital processing block that runs a part of the authentication process based on the cryptographic
algorithms [51]. In these studies, the digital circuit has been implemented in FPGA or Application
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), and hardware performance of the circuit in the sense of area
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requirements and power consumption has been evaluated by a simulation.
1.2 Motivation and Contribution of This Thesis
In this thesis, we set basic security strength as 80-bit by the following reason. In the future, Tril-
lion Sensor Society will come and a trillion sensors will be utilized in IoT [101]. We assume
that the privacy preserving authentication protocol will be implemented in all the devices. A
non-volatile memory is required to realize the privacy preserving authentication protocol. Ferro-
electric Random Access Memory (FRAM), which is a kind of non-volatile memory and is now
under developing, will be implemented in the device. It is reported that the number of possible
write operation will be 1012 [38]. When a trillion tags including FRAM memory run the pri-
vacy preserving authentication protocol, data patterns needed for device authentication will be
1012  1012  280.
Towards security and privacy enhancement of the tags, several studies have been done. Unfor-
tunately, the feasibility of the authentication protocol using a prototyping of the tag has not been
studied. Namely, a silicon proof of the circuit and performance evaluation of the tag including a
digital circuit, an analog front end circuit, and an antenna have not been studied.
We focus on four parts needed for realizing a secure RFID tag. The main contribution in this
thesis consists of the following four parts:
1. Design of hardware architecture for cryptographic algorithm
2. Selection of cryptographic algorithm
3. Design of lightweight pseudorandom number generator
4. Design, implementation, and evaluation of secure tag
First, we decide hardware architecture for the authentication protocol. We conclude that the
parallel architecture is suitable for hash functions. Second, we select cryptographic algorithms.
We evaluate hardware performance of cryptographic algorithms implemented with the above men-
tioned hardware architecture. We conclude that SPONGENT-160 is a good candidate when low-
area requirements and low-power consumption take priority over high-speed performance. On the
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other hand, NIST standard hash function Keccak [18] will be used when high-speed performance
takes priority over power consumption. Third, we establish a pseudorandom number generating
method. We design a lightweight pseudorandom number generator using the hash function that
is the cryptographic component of the privacy preserving authentication protocol. We conclude
that our proposed method generates a binary sequence that can be thought uniformly distributed.
Fourth, we evaluate performance of a silicon chip on an RFID system. We design, implement,
and evaluate a tag, which runs the privacy authentication protocol, including the digital processing
block, the analog front end block, and the antenna. We conclude that even the standard crypto-
graphic algorithm works in the tag.
First Contribution: Design of hardware architecture for cryptographic algorithm
To implement a cryptographic algorithm in the tag, selection of the cryptographic algorithm is
needed since a lot of cryptographic algorithms have been developed. When we select a crypto-
graphic algorithm for the tag, hardware performance of the cryptographic circuit is an important
metric. As the hardware performance of the cryptographic circuit depends on implementation
architecture of the cryptographic algorithm, it is important to decide the hardware architecture.
Saarinen et al. have studied cryptographic algorithms for a tag from a viewpoint of hardware
implementation of the cryptographic algorithms [96]. They have mentioned that previous works
had been focused on minimizing the area requirements of the cryptographic algorithms and had
not pay attention to the time needed for the cryptographic process. They mentioned that the
lightweight hash functions are inappropriate for a tag since these algorithms take a large number
of clock cycles.
However, they have not taken care of the security strength. They have evaluated the number of
clock cycles needed for generating 16-bit output. We deduce that this data length is too short to
enhance the security of the tag. This is because the outputs of two dierent tags have the same
value with a probability of 1=28. This situation causes authentication failure of the tags.
The first contribution of this thesis is that we decide the hardware architecture of the cryp-
tographic algorithms for a tag. We have focused on hash functions and stream ciphers that are
widely used for a cryptographic component of the authentication protocols. Hardware perfor-
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mance of the cryptographic algorithms in the sense of time needed for the cryptographic process
depends on hardware architecture. Thus, we have picked up and designed hardware architectures
for the cryptographic algorithms. One is the parallel architecture. All bits of data stored in the
Flip Flops (FFs) are taken as the input to the update function and the output of the update function
are returned to the FFs. A characteristic of the parallel architecture is that all bits of data stored
in the FFs are updated simultaneously. The other is the sequential architecture. A part of the FFs
are taken as the input to the update function and the output of the update function is stored in a
buer. Then, the data stored in the FFs shift sequentially. Finally, the data stored in the buer are
returned to the FFs. A characteristic of the sequential architecture is that data stored in the FFs
are updated sequentially.
We have evaluated the number of clock cycles of the cryptographic circuits based on these
hardware architectures. Our evaluation results show that when the hash function is implemented
with the parallel architecture, the numbers of clock cycles are less than 1600. On the other hand,
when the hash function is implemented with the sequential architecture, the numbers of clock
cycles reach to 900000. Thus, the number of clock cycles dier 600 times according to the
hardware architecture. The numbers of clock cycles of the stream ciphers are less than 1600 when
these algorithms are implemented with both architectures.
In conclusion, we deduce that the parallel architecture is suitable for the hash function and both
of the architectures are suitable for the stream ciphers to achieve high speed performance.
Second Contribution: Selection of cryptographic algorithm
Usually, hardware performance of a cryptographic algorithm has been reported in a paper that
proposes the cryptographic algorithm. In these studies, dierent tools are used for performance
evaluations. However, hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithms depend not only
hardware architecture but also evaluation tools such as evaluation platform, compiler, or libraries.
Therefore it is dicult to compare hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithm simply
using these evaluation results.
Kerckho et al. have evaluated hardware performance of 6 block ciphers in the sense of area
requirements, power consumption, throughput, and energy using the same evaluation tool [58].
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Batina et al. have evaluated hardware performance of 11 block ciphers in the sense of area re-
quirements, power consumption, and energy using the same evaluation tool [16]. These studies
have focused on a fair comparison between AES and recently developed block ciphers.
However, in these studies, the interface of the cryptographic circuit has not been paid attention.
The cryptographic circuit is connected to another circuit in the tag to realize some function. Thus,
we deduce that it is important to evaluate hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithms
under the condition that the interface of the cryptographic circuit is designed to meet with the tag.
The second contribution of this thesis is that we select a cryptographic algorithm for a tag
based on hardware evaluation results. We focus on hash functions and stream ciphers that are
vastly used for tag authentication protocols. First, we design the interface of the cryptographic
circuit. As shown in Algorithm. 1.2, a part of the input data for the cryptographic circuit is sent
from the reader. The output of the cryptographic circuit are compared with data received from
the reader. This comparison process is done in another circuit. Therefore, it is natural to store
the input data and the output data of the cryptographic circuit in a temporal memory that can be
accessed from various circuits. Thus, we design the interface of the cryptographic circuit based on
SRAM. The data width of the SRAM has variation such as 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit. As the data
width is larger, the area requirements of the circuits are larger. To achieve low-area requirements,
we select the data width to 8-bit. We design the interface of the cryptographic circuit based on
8-bit SRAM.
Second, we implement the hash functions and the stream ciphers in ASIC based on the hardware
architecture that we decided before. Namely, we implement the hash functions with the parallel
architecture and the stream ciphers with both the parallel architecture and the sequential archi-
tecture. Then, we evaluate hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithms in the sense of
area requirements and the number of signal toggles. The number of signal toggles is a key metric
for power consumption. The power consists of two parts. One is the static power resulted from
the leakage current. The other is the dynamic power resulted from the switching activity of the
transistors. As the static power is small in Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
devices, the dynamic power takes a dominant part of the power consumption. The number of sig-
nal toggles reflects the switching activity of the transistors directly. From our evaluation results,
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SPONGENT-160 achieves low-area requirements and low-power consumption. Keccak achieves
high-speed performance while it takes large area requirements and consumes power.
In conclusion, when low-area requirements and low-power consumption have priority over
high-speed performance, SPONGENT-160 is a good candidate for the hash function on the tag.
On the other hand, when high-speed performance has priority over low-area requirements and
low-power consumption, Keccak can be used as the hash function for the tag. When the stream
ciphers are required, Grain and Enocoro implemented with the parallel architecture or the sequen-
tial architecture can be used.
Third Contribution: Design of lightweight pseudorandom number generator
The tag authentication protocol consists of two cryptographic components; hash function and
PseudoRandom Number Generator (PRNG). Previous studies make it cleared that security weak-
ness of tags caused from mainly pseudorandom number generator [68][45][78][49][44]. There-
fore, PRNGs for a tag have been studied[65][60].
Lopez et al. have focused on Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) PRNG [65]. Katti et al. have pro-
posed PRNG based on linear congruent generator using addition, multiplication, and modular
reduction [60]. A lightweight PRNG using addition and multiplication has been developed [71].
Mujahid et al. have proposed a PRNG using bitwise right rotation, bitwise OR, multiplication,
and modulo addition [69]. M-Segui et al. have proposed PRNG based on Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LRSR) configured with multiple polynomials selected by a physical source [94][95].
Chen et al. have proposed multiple polynomial LFSR based PRNG [27].
However, from the viewpoint of implementation, it is required to implement not only the cryp-
tographic circuit but also a PRNG circuit. Therefore, to achieve low-area requirements of the
tag, pseudorandom number is desired to be generated using the cryptographic circuit since the
cryptographic circuit and PRNG circuit are not activated simultaneously. While pseudorandom
number generating methods using cryptographic algorithms are standardized by National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [79], these methods require much hardware resources.
Therefore, we focus on a hash function and we study a lightweight pseudorandom number
generating method using the hash function. First, we propose a lightweight pseudorandom number
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generating method based on hash chain. Our method works as follows. The seed is taken as the
input to the hash function. Then, the output of the hash function is divided into two parts. One
is used for the updated seed, which is stored secretly, and the other is used for the pseudorandom
number that is returned.
Second, we evaluate the lightweight pseudorandom number generating method from the view-
point of randomness. We use NIST test suite [81] and Diehard test suite [30], since these tests are
widely used as a statistical test to measure the randomness of the data. We select SPONGENT-
160 as the hash function since it has been cleared from our studies that the algorithm is a good
candidate for a tag. We generate a binary sequence using our proposed method and evaluate the
randomness of the binary sequence with NIST test suit and Diehard test suite.
Our evaluation results show that the binary sequence passes all tests included in NIST test suite
and Diehard test suite. Thus, we deduce that the output of our proposed method can be thought
uniformly distributed. Our method achieves 53 % less area requirements of the cryptographic
circuit compared with the area requirements of a cryptographic circuit including a lightweight
hash function and a lightweight stream cipher as PRNG.
To realize the NIST method, additional components such as an expansion function are required
to generate a long sequence of pseudorandom bits. On the other hand, our proposed method
does not require additional components such as an expansion function, as the bit length of the
pseudorandom number is not long for RFID tag. Therefore, our proposed method achieves low
area requirements. In conclusion, our lightweight pseudorandom number generating method is
useful for tag.
Fourth Contribution: Design, implementation, and evaluation of secure tag
The hardware performance of the cryptographic modules or the digital processing blocks that run
a part of the authentication process has been studied. FPGA implementation results of the digital
processing block that executes a hash-based challenge-response protocol have been studied [105].
Implementation results of OSK protocol on an IC card have been studied [1]. ASIC implemen-
tation results of the digital processing block including AES [80] and Grain [7][53][54] have been
studied [36]. ASIC implementation results of CRYPTOGPS including PRESENT [21] have been
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studied [91].
However, as an application of the cryptography, the cryptographic circuit has not been com-
bined with a hardware restricted device. The feasibility of the protocol has not been studied.
Namely, implementation and evaluation of the whole tag has not been studied. To realize a tag
that runs the authentication protocol, not only a digital processing block but also several blocks
such as an analog front end, non-volatile memory, and an antenna are required to be implemented
in the tag. As these blocks operate in a mutually coupled manner to run the authentication proto-
col, it is important to implement these blocks in the tag for performance evaluation.
In addition, it has been widely believed that a lightweight cryptographic algorithm is an essen-
tial component for a tag and a standard cryptographic algorithm is not suitable for a tag. However,
performance overhead of a tag resulted from the standard cryptographic algorithm compared with
the lightweight cryptographic algorithm has not been cleared. Therefore, a field test is required.
We design a completely assembled tag including a digital processing block, an analog front end
block, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), SRAM, and an an-
tenna. To achieve low area requirements of the tag, we implement these blocks except the antenna
in a single chip. As a cryptographic algorithm, we select SPONGENT-160 and we implement the
algorithm with the parallel architecture in accordance with our performance evaluation results. To
discuss the impact of the hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithm for the tag, we also
select Keccak and we implement the algorithm with the parallel architecture. To generate pseudo-
random number, we use SPONGENT-160 or Keccak as the instance of the hash function needed
for our proposed lightweight pseudorandom number generating method. These two hash functions
can be switched and used by introducing a debug functionality. Namely, when SPONGENT-160
is used as the hash function, SPONGENT-160 is called for PRNG. When Keccak is used as the
hash function, Keccak is called for PRNG.
We carried out a full silicon proof of the tag. Then, we evaluate hardware performance of the
tag in the sense of area requirements, power consumption, operating time, and maximum read
distance of the tag.
Our evaluation results show that when SPONGENT-160 is used, the maximum read distance is
10 cm. The operating time is less than 30 ms. The area requirements of the cryptographic block
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are 10 kGE. The average power consumption of the cryptographic block is 260 Wwhen the hash
function is active. When Keccak is used, the maximum read distance is 8.5 cm. The operating
time is less than 20 ms. The area requirements of the cryptographic block are about 39.4 kGE.
The average power consumption of the cryptographic block is 536 W when the hash function is
active.
We have designed a passive tag with the analog power block that has enough capacity to supply
power to the circuit absolutely. When we use smaller analog power block, the impact of the
cryptographic block in the sense of power consumption will become larger. Then the lightweight
cryptographic algorithm will have advantage.
In conclusion, the feasibility of the privacy preserving authentication protocol based on cryp-
tographic algorithms is demonstrated. In addition, it is verified that the standard cryptographic
algorithm works on the tag.
1.3 Towards Future Research Topic
As a usual tag sends a constant data to a reader, there is a privacy concern that an owner of the tag
can be tracked by tracing the tag’s response. To overcome the privacy issue, the privacy-preserving
tag authentication protocol based on a cryptographic algorithm has been developed. Our results
described in this thesis show the feasibility of the authentication protocol for the tag. Thus, the
security and the privacy of the tag can be enhanced by running the protocol sequence in the tag.
On the other hand, since the tags are attached to many kinds of devices, an attacker can handle the
tags easily. Therefore, the tag will be exposed to side channel attack.
Countermeasure for side channel attack
We deduce that the privacy preserving authentication protocol is vulnerable to side channel attack.
After the tag receives a random number from the reader and the tag generates a random number,
the tag generates a response with a hash function by inputting the secret key and two kinds of
random numbers. Then, the tag sends the response to the reader. Immediately after this step, we
move away the tag from the reader. The tag cannot receive enough power to run the protocol
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sequence from the reader. Since the secret key in the tag is not updated, the secret key will be
taken as the input to the hash function to generate tag’s response at the next time. We deduce that
the secret key in the tag can be revealed by dierential side channel attack. Since we implement
the cryptographic block and the analog power block in a single chip, it seems dicult to measure
the power consumption of the cryptographic block by tapping directly the power supply line from
the analog power block to the cryptographic block. On the other hand, since electro magnetic
wave resulted from an electric current in the cryptographic block can be captured by EM probe,
electro magnetic analysis can be applied to the tag. Therefore, we deduce that the secret key in
the tag can be revealed by dierential electro magnetic analysis.
Our previous results show that the secret key of Enocoro implemented in FPGA can be revealed
by dierential power analysis using 1000 traces [75]. It takes about 5 minutes to collect the traces.
When the dierential electro magnetic analysis is applied to the tag, it is needed to move the tag
and to initialize the tag’s state. It takes about 100 ms to volatile data stored in SRAM [24].
Power-on o operations of the reader is also needed. Therefore, it is predicted that it takes about
30 minutes to collect traces for the dierential electro magnetic attack.
As the countermeasure techniques against the dierential side channel attack, data hiding
method and data masking method have been studied [70]. The data hiding method includes
WDDL [102]. It has been cleared that information leakage occurs even after applying the data
hiding method [70][98][74]. This information leakage results from a balance of load capacitance
or delay time of input signals. The data masking method includes threshold implementation
technique [85]. The threshold implementation technique is based on masking using random
number and secret sharing. According to our previous results, the area requirements of the
threshold implementation version of Enocoro are three times larger than that of unprotected
version of Enocoro [75]. The linear components in the cryptographic circuit are implemented in
three parallel manners. The number of input and output signals of the nonlinear components in
the cryptographic circuits are three times larger than that of unprotected version of the nonlinear
components. Therefore, it is predicted that the number of signal toggles in the threshold version of
the cryptographic algorithm is three times larger than that of unprotected version of the algorithm.
According to our evaluation results in this thesis, there is a liner relationship between the number
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of signal toggles and the power consumption. Therefore, the threshold implementation version of
the cryptographic circuit will consume three times larger power than unprotected version of the
one.
1.4 Structure of This Thesis
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Figure. 1.2 Structure of this thesis
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Figure. 1.2 shows the structure of this thesis. In Part I, we describe the introduction including
research background, motivation, and contribution of this thesis. In Part II, we summarize the
knowledge of RFID system including tag, RFID standards, RFID reader, backend system, secu-
rity threat, and requirement. Further, we describe the knowledge of cryptographic algorithms,
hardware implementation platform, and performance evaluation metrics. In Part III, we describe
selection method of cryptographic component including hardware architecture and performance
evaluation results of cryptographic algorithms. In Part IV, we propose a lightweight pseudoran-
dom number generating method using a hash function and we evaluate the randomness of the
output of the proposed method. In Part V, we describe a secure RFID tag including the specifi-
cation of the tag and hardware evaluation results of the tag. Finally, we conclude this thesis and
suggest future research directions in Part VI.
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Part II
RFID and Lightweight Cryptographic
Algorithms

Chapter 2
RFID
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we summarize RFID. We describe variation of RFID tags, RFID standards, RFID
reader, backend system, security, and privacy issue.
2.2 Tags
RFID tags are categorized into three types according to the RF [37].
2.2.1 LF Tag
Low Frequency (LF) band covers the RF spectrum ranging from 125 kHz to 134 kHz. As this RF
is lower than the others, the size and the number of turns of the antenna are larger than that of the
others. In addition, the order of the read rate is a few bits/s. The typical operating distance of the
tag is around 1 m. The application areas of the tag are vehicle immobilizers, pet identification,
and access control.
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2.2.2 HF Tag
High Frequency (HF) tag operates at 13.56 MHz. As the tag operates at high frequency, the tag
achieves higher data rates than that of the LF tag. The order of the data rate is Kbits/s. As the HF
tag operates in shorter wavelengths compared to the LF tag, the antenna size is smaller than that
of the LF tag. Thanks to this property, the antenna takes flexible form such as a paper label, and
a card. The typical operating distance is about 0.7 m. The application areas of the tag are credit
cards, ticketing, and library management.
2.2.3 UHF Tag
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) tag covers the RF spectrum ranging from 868 MHz to 928 MHz.
The frequency band of the UHF tag are dierent in the countries. For example, in the US, the
frequency band is 902-928 MHz. In Europe, the frequency band is 865-867 MHz. In Japan, the
frequency band is 920 MHz. For energy propagation, the tag reflects back the electromagnetic
wave that received from a reader. This technique is called backscatter modulation. The dipole
antennas are typically used in the UHF tag. The form of the antenna can be linear or circular
depending on the application of the tag. The typical operating distance is from 1 to 6 m. The
applications of the tag are the supply chain, the logistics, and the item management.
2.3 RFID Standards
2.3.1 EPCGlobal
There are two important standards. One is developed by EPCGlobal. EPCGlobal is a consortium
of several companies and universities. EPCGlobal Generation 2 is the most important standard
developed by EPCGlobal [34]. In EPCGlobal Geneation 2, tags are classified into 5 classes. Class
0 tag refers to the read only passive tag. ID is implemented in the tag when the integrated circuit
is manufactured. Class 1 tag refers to write-once passive tag. ID of this class of the tag can be
written once by users. Class 2 tag refers to rewritable passive tag. Class 2 tag has rewritable
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memory and authenticated access control. Class 3 tag refers to semi active tag that has a battery
to supply power. Finally, class 4 tag refers to active tag. The communication distance of the tag
is longer and complex processes can be done on the tag. EPC Tag Data Standard Version 1.6 [35]
defines the ID length as 96, 113, 170, 195, 198, and 202-bit.
2.3.2 ISO
The other standard is developed by ISO. ISO standards define RFID in ISO 18000. ISO 18000 is
a multistandard that deals with operating frequencies. ISO 18000-1 standard describes reference
architecture and definition of parameters. ISO 18000-2 refers to parameters for air interface com-
munications below 135 kHz. ISO 18000-3 refers to parameters for air interface communications
at 13.56 MHz. ISO 18000-4 refers to parameters for air interface communications at 2.45 GHz.
ISO 18000-5 is not listed. ISO 18000-6 refers to parameters for air interface communications
at 860 MHz to 960 MHz. ISO 18000-7 refers to parameters for air interface communications at
433 MHz. Here, ISO18000-6 standard is met with EPCGlobal Generation 2 Class 1.
Another important ISO standards are ISO 14443 and ISO 15693. ISO 14443 standard defines
the contactless integrated circuits cards (proximity cards). ISO14443-1 standard refers to physical
characteristics. ISO14443-2 standard refers to the RF power and signal interface. ISO 14443-
3 standard refers to initialization and anticollision. ISO 15963 standards define the contactless
integrated circuits cards (vicinity cards). ISO/IEC 15963 defines the ID length as 64-bit.
2.4 RFID Reader
RFID reader is a device that sends data to the tag and receives data from the tag. The reader
consists of an antenna, a microprocessor, and an interface for sending data to the backend system.
The antenna is required to communicate with the tag wirelessly. The microprocessor is used to
control the device. The reader sends the data received from the tag to a backend system. The
reader generates the electromagnetic field to supply power to the tag.
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2.5 Backend System
The backend system is connected to the reader. The backend system consists of a server. The
backend system stores tag’s data including ID and processes data that are sent to the tag. The
backend system controls the tags.
2.6 Security and Privacy
2.6.1 Threat
A tag has risks against security and user privacy. As the tags are inexpensive devices and the tags
communicate wirelessly, RFID system has vulnerabilities and is susceptible to malicious attacks.
An attacker tries to imitate a legitimate tag to communicate with the reader. The attacker uses
an electronic device having an antenna to capture the data, which includes tag’s ID stored in
the memory of the legitimate tag, communicated between the legitimate tag and the reader. The
attacker copies the data. A cloned tag is easily manufactured by copying the data of the legal tag
into the memory. The attacker is able to fool the reader to accept the cloned tag as a legitimate tag.
It is clear that two tags with the same identifier in a single RFID system will confuse the system
and compromise the security of the system.
In addition, the captured data are used to execute replay attack by the attacker. The attacker
may capture valid communication data and resend the data to the reader at a later time. Even if
the tag sends an encrypted data to the reader, the tag is still vulnerable to the replay attack because
the tag sends a fixed data.
As the tags are inexpensive devices, tamper resistant devices are no required. Therefore, the
tags may suer from side channel attacks that attempt to reveal secret data including keys stored
in the memory of the tag. A circuit shows dierent characteristics of power consumption and
electromagnetic wave radiation depending on data that are processed in the circuit. An attacker
records the power consumed by the tag or the electromagnetic wave generated by the tag. Then,
the attacker amplifies the dierence of the power or the electromagnetic wave depending on the
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data processed in the tag to recover the secret data stored in the tag.
As the tags are small and embedded into the objects, it is hard for human beings to identify
the tags. However, the tag sends response to the readers whenever the tags receive queries from
the reader. Therefore, anyone who has a reader can read the tag’s response. The data sent from
the tags provide identification data or location data of the tags. Information leakage about the tag
and the object, which is attached with the tag, is called contents privacy issue. The identification
data may include data about the objects such as price, name, and date when the user buys the
objects. When the tags are attached to particular objects, the tag’s response will include sensitive
information of the users. For example, when the tag is attached to the medicine, the tag’s response
will reveal a particular disease. When the tag is attached to books, the tag’s response will link to
thought.
Since the tag’s response stays the same, it is easy for an attacker to track the user of the tag
by tracing the tag’s response. Information leakage about location of the tag and users is called
location privacy issue.
2.6.2 Requirement
To prevent incoming an illegal tag into the RFID system, tag authentication is required. To solve
the contents privacy issue, it is eective to encrypt tag’s response. This is because an attacker
cannot understand the meaning of the data. Even if the tag’s response is encrypted, the attacker
is able to trace the tag since the encrypted data are fixed. To solve the location privacy issues, the
tag’s response should be variable.
The secret information in the memory needed to generate tag’s response should not be leaked
to the attacker. Once the secret information is revealed by the attacker, the attacker can recover
the tag’s previous responses. This means that the attacker is able to traceback the action of the
users. On the other hand, a tamper resistant memory is hesitated to use in the tag as the tag
is an expensive device. To enhance the security of the tag against this issue, forward security
is required. Forward security means that even if the current secret information is leaked to the
attacker, it is dicult to recover the previous tag’s data.
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Chapter 3
Lightweight Cryptographic
Algorithms
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we summarize cryptographic components that are key components to enhance
security and privacy of the tag. We describe specification of some lightweight cryptographic
algorithms, hardware implementation platforms, and hardware performance evaluation metrics.
3.2 Symmetric Cryptographic Primitives
Symmetric cryptographic primitive uses the same cryptographic keys for both encryption of the
plaintext and decryption of the ciphertext. The keys must be shared between two or more parties
that send and receive data. In addition, the keys must be distributed to the parties securely. For
example, the legitimate parties sends the keys over a secure channel. There are three classes of
the symmetric cryptographic primitives: block ciphers, stream ciphers, and hash functions.
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3.2.1 Block Cipher
A block cipher is a symmetric key algorithm operating on fixed length of bits, called block. Usu-
ally, the block lengths are set to 64-bit, 80-bit, or 128-bit. A block cipher transforms a block of
a plaintext into a block of a ciphertext that has the same block length with the plaintext. Most of
the block ciphers iterate the same function, which is called a round function, several times. The
round key, which is taken as an input to the round function, is varied in each round. Decryption
is the inverse operation of the encryption. It recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext using the
same secret key.
A lot of block cipher algorithms have been developed. DES algorithm had been a NIST standard
block cipher listed in NIST FIPS 46. The key size is 56-bit and the block size is 80-bit. How-
ever, as an eective attack on DES using a cryptanalysis technique called linear cryptanalysis
has developed, NIST withdraw NIST FIPS 46 [84]. DES has been replaced by AES that has been
standardized by NIST in 2001 [80]. The key sizes are 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit. The block size
is 128-bit. Other standardized block ciphers are Camellia [8], CREFIA [97], and PRESENT [21].
Camellia has been adopted as an ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard. CREFIA and PRESENT have been
adopted as ISO/IEC 19291-2 standard.
3.2.2 Stream Cipher
A stream cipher is a symmetric cryptographic algorithms operating on flexible length of bits se-
quentially in the unit of bit or byte. A stream cipher consists of two processes. One is a pseu-
dorandom number generating process and the other is an encryption process. A pseudorandom
number generating process generates a keystream from a seed that is treated as a secret key. The
keystream is combined with a plaintext using XOR operation on the encryption process. Decryp-
tion is the same operation of the encryption. It recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext using the
same seed.
A lot of stream ciphers have been developed. MUGI [104], SNOW 2.0 [32], Rabbit [23],
Decim v2 [12], and KCipher-2 [61] have been adopted as ISO/IEC 18033-4 standard. Enocoro
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and Trivium have been adopted as ISO/IEC 29192-3 standard.
3.2.3 Hash Function
A hash function maps binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of a fixed length. The
input data is called message and the output is called hash value. Hash functions have many
applications such as digital signature, message authentication code, authentication, fingerprinting,
and checksum.
A lot of hash functions have been developed. The most widely used hash functions have been
SHA-1 and MD5. These hash functions output 128-bit hash value. However, the security of MD5
is compromised and an attack on SHA-1 was reported in 2005.
The improved versions of SHA-1 are called SHA-2 and they are standardized by NIST as NIST
FIPS 180-4 [83]. SHA-2 is a set of hash functions including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256. The output of these hash functions are 224-bit,
256-bit, 384-bit, 512-bit, 224-bit, and 256-bit, respectively. SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256 are
truncate versions of SHA-512.
In 2007, NIST opened a competition to select a new standard hash function SHA-3. 51 kinds
of hash functions have been submitted to the competition. In 2009, 14 kinds of hash func-
tions have been selected as second round candidates. The second round candidates are Kec-
cak [18][17], BLAKE [4], Grstl [47], JH [103], Skein [40], Blue midnight wish [46], Cube-
Hash [10], ECHO [13], Fugue [52], Hamsi [57], Lua [29], Shabal [14], SHAvite-3 [15], and
SIMD [63]. In 2010, NIST announced 5 finalists including Keccak, BLAKE, Grstl, JH, and
Skein. In 2012, Keccak has been selected as SHA-3.
Keccak
Keccak is a family of hash functions and it has been developed by Bertoni et al. Keccak is based
on a sponge construction and has seven variations depending on the size of the internal state.
The permutation function is called Keccak- f . Keccak- f is characterized by the width b of the
permutation. The width b is selected from f25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600g and is equal to the
width of the state. The state is represented with three dimensional matrix. The size of the matrix
is 5-bit  5-bit  w-bit, where w = b=25. The two dimensional matrix 5  5  1 is called a slice.
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Algorithm. 3.1 Keccak algorithm
Input: the state A, the round constants RC
Output: the updated state A
1: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,24 do
2: for x = 0, 1, . . . ,4 do
3: C[x] = A[x,0]  A[x,1] A[x,2] A[x,3] A[x,4].
4: end for
5: for x = 0, 1, . . . ,4 do
6: D[x] = C[x-1]  ROT(C[x+1],1).
7: end for
8: for all (x,y) such that 0  x  4; 0  y  4 do
9: A[x,y] = A[x,y]  D[x].
10: end for
11: for all (x,y) such that 0  x  4; 0  y  4 do
12: B[y,2x+3y] = ROT(A[x,y], r[x,y]).
13: end for
14: for all (x,y) such that 0  x  4; 0  y  4 do
15: A[x,y] =B[x,y]  ((not B[x+1,y]) and B[x+2,y]).
16: end for
17: A[0,0] = A[0,0]  RoundConst.
18: end for
The one dimentional matrix 1  1  w is called a lane.
The state is initialized with 0. The input message is padded with a single 1 and then zeros are
added until the message length is a multiple of the rate size r. Then, the message is cut into blocks
that have r bits. The block is xored with the first r bits of the state interleaved with the application
of the permutation. The state is taken as the input to the permutation and is updated with the
output of the permutation.
After all blocks are xored with the state, the squeezing process begins. In the squeezing process,
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the first r bits of the state are returned as a hash block interleaved with the application of the
permutation. The state is taken as the input to the permutation and is updated with the output of
the permutation. The squeezing process continues until desired bits of hash values are generated.
The permutation consists of the round function. The round function consists of five functions.
Namely,  function,  function,  function,  function, and  function. The round number is defined
by nr = 12 + 2  l, where 2l = w. We describe a pseudo code of Keccak- f in Algorithm. 3.1.
B[x,y], C[x,y], and D[x] are intermediate values. r[x,y] is constant value.
3.3 Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithms
In this section, we describe specification of some lightweight cryptographic algorithms. Table 3.1
shows a list of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms that we treat in this thesis. Trivium and
Table 3.1 List of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms
Lightweight stream cipher Grain
Trivium
Enocoro
Lightweight hash function SPONGENT
QUARK
PHOTON
Enocoro are ISO standard lightweight stream ciphers. These algorithms are listed in ISO/IEC
29192-3. Trivium is a finalist of the eSTREAM project, which was started by ECRYPT to select
stream ciphers, in Profile 2. Grain is another finalist of the project.
ISO/IEC has started discussion of standardizing lightweight hash functions. Several kinds of
lightweight hash functions will be adopted as ISO/IEC standard lightweight hash function and will
be listed in ISO/IEC 29192-5. As the candidates of the lightweight hash functions, SPONGENT,
QUARK, and PHOTON have been developed.
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3.3.1 Grain
Grain is designed by Hell, Johansson, and Meier. It has been submitted to eSTREAM in 2004
and it has been selected as an eSTREAM Portfolio Profile 2 [54]. The key size is 80-bit and the
IV size is 64-bit. Grain is a bit-oriented synchronous stream cipher. Namely, the keystream is
generated independently from the plaintext. The size of the internal state is 160-bit.
The algorithm consists of two phases. The first one is the initialization phase. In this phase,
key and IV are taken as the input to the internal state. The internal state is updated 160 times
repeatedly. The second one is the pseudorandom number generating phase. In this phase, the
internal state is continuously updated and the keystream is generated interleaved with the update
of the internal state.
The internal state consists of two shift registers. One is 80-bit LFSR and the other is 80-bit
NFSR. LFSR is represented as si; si+1; : : : si+79 from the leftmost bit. NFSR is represented as
bi; bi+1; : : : ; bi+79 from the leftmost bit.
　　　
NFSR LFSR
output
12 bits
4 bits
6 bits
g f
h
　　　
Figure. 3.1 Structure of Grain
　　　
The key is taken as the input to NFSR. Figure. 3.1 shows a structure of Grain. The IV and
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constant number are taken as the input to LFSR. The output of LFSR is taken as an input to
NFSR. Here, f (s) and g(s; b) are update functions for LFSR and NFSR, respectively. h(s; b) is
output function. The output of h(s; b) is feedbacked to LFSR in the initialization phase. In the
pseudorandom number generating phase, the output of h(s; b) is returned as keystream.
Since both LFSR and NFSR shift one bit per clock, the algorithm generates keystream one bit
per clock. However, it is easy to speed up by implementing the update functions and the output
function t times parallely and shifting t bits per clock. The number of clock cycles needed for the
initialization phase is 160=t. The cipher generates t-bit keystream per clock. The elements in the
functions are required to be implemented t times. By implementing these functions parallely, it is
possible to speed up the cipher without lengthening the critical path. Since 16 bits of the state are
not taken as an input to the functions, up to 16 iterations can be computed at a clock.
(1) Update function
The update function of LFSR, f (s) is defined by the following equation.
f (s) = si+62 + si+51 + si+38 + si+23 + si+13 + si: (3.1)
The update function of NFSR, g(s; b) is defined by the following equation.
g(s; b) = si + bi+63 + bi+60 + bi+52 + bi+45 + bi+37 + bi+33 + bi+28 + bi+21 + bi+15 + bi+9
+ bi + bi+63bi+60 + bi+37bi+33 + bi+15bi+9 + bi+60bi+52bi+45 + bi+33bi+28bi+21
+ bi+63bi+45bi+28bi+9 + bi+60bi+52bi+37bi+33 + bi+63bi+60bi+21bi+15
+ bi+33bi+28bi+21bi+15bi+9 + bi+52bi+45bi+37bi+33bi+28bi+21: (3.2)
(2) Output function
h(s; b) is defined by the following equation.
h(s; b) = si+25 + bi+63 + si+3si+64 + si+46si+64 + si+64bi+63 + si+3si+25si+46 + si+3si+46si+64
+ si+3si+46bi+63 + si+25si+46bi+63 + si+46si+64bi+63: (3.3)
Grain generates a pseudorandom number by xoring h(s; b) and bi.
(3) Initialization
In the initialization phase, 80-bit key, 64-bit IV, and 16-bit constant are taken as the input to the
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internal state.
bi = Ki; 0  i < 80; (3.4)
si = Ii; 0  i < 63; (3.5)
si = 1; 64  i < 80; (3.6)
where, Ki and Ii are key byte and IV byte, respectively.
3.3.2 Trivium
Trivium is designed by De Canni‘ere and Preneel. It has been submitted to eSTREAM in 2004
and it has been selected as an eSTREAM Portfolio Profile 2 [26][25]. Trivium has been adopted
as an ISO/IEC 29192-2 standard stream cipher. Trivium is a bit-oriented synchronous stream
cipher. The key size is 80-bit and the IV size is 80-bit. The size of the internal state is 288-bit.
The internal state is represented by s1; s2; : : : ; s288 from the leftmost bit.
In the initialization phase, key and IV are taken as the input to the internal state. The internal
state is updated 1152 times in the initialization phase. In the pseudorandom number generating
phase, the internal state is continuously updated and the keystream is generated interleaved with
the update of the internal state. The internal state consists of three LFSRs. These LFSRs have
dierent sizes. These sizes are 93-bit, 84-bit, and 115-bit, respectively.
The key, IV, and constants are taken as the input to LFSRs. Figure. 3.2 shows a structure of
Trivium. Here, f (x) and g(x) are update functions for LFSRs. The data generated by xoring the
outputs of g(x) is not returned in the initialization phase. In the pseudorandom number generating
phase, the data generated by xoring the outputs of g(x) is returned as keystream.
Since LFSRs shift one bit per clock, Trivium generates keystream one bit per clock. In similar
to Grain, it is easy to speed up by implementing update functions t times parallely and shifting t
bits per clock. The number of clock cycles needed for the initialization phase is 1152=t. The cipher
generates t-bit keystream per clock. The elements of the functions are required to be implemented
t times. By implementing these functions parallely, it is possible to speed up the cipher without
lengthening the critical path. Since 64 bits of the state are not taken as an input to the functions,
up to 64 iterations can be computed at a clock.
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Figure. 3.2 Structure of Trivium
　　　
(1) Update function
Algorithm. 3.2 shows the update function. Here, N is the bit length of the desired output.
(2) Output function
Trivium outputs zi as a pseudorandom bit.
(3) Initialization
In the initialization phase, the internal state is initialized by key, IV, and constant.
(s1; s2; : : : ; s93) = (K1;K2; : : : ;K80; 0; : : : ; 0); (3.7)
(s94; s95; : : : ; s177) = (IV1; IV2; : : : ; IV80; 0; : : : ; 0); (3.8)
(s178; s179; : : : ; s288) = (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 1; 1): (3.9)
Here, Ki and Ii are key byte and IV byte, respectively.
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Algorithm. 3.2 Update function of Trivium
Input: the internal state s
Output: the pseudorandom number zi
1: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N do
2: t1 = s66 + s93.
3: t2 = s162 + s177.
4: t3 = s243 + s288.
5: zi = t1 + t2 + t3.
6: t1 = t1 + s91  s92 + s171.
7: t2 = t2 + s175  s176 + s264.
8: t3 = t3 + s286  s287 + s69.
9: (s1; s2; : : : ; s93) = (t3; s1; s2; : : : ; s92).
10: (s94; s95; : : : ; s177) = (t1; s94; s95; : : : ; s176).
11: (s178; s179; : : : ; s288) = (t3; s178; s179; : : : ; s287).
12: end for
3.3.3 Enocoro
Enocoro is designed by Hitachi Ltd. It is adopted as an ISO/IEC 29192-2 standard stream ci-
pher [50]. The key size is 80-bit and the IV size is 64-bit. Enocoro is a byte-oriented synchronous
stream cipher. In the initialization phase, key, IV, and constants are taken as the input to the inter-
nal state. The size of the internal state is 176-bit. The internal state consists of state and buer.
The buer is LFSR and its size is 160-bit. The state is represented by a0; a1 from the leftmost
byte. The buer is represented by b0; b1; : : : ; b19 from the leftmost byte. The ith byte of the state
and the buer at time t are represented by ati, b
t
i, respectively.
The internal state is updated 40 times repeatedly. In the pseudorandom number generating
phase, the internal state is continuously updated and the keystream is generated interleaved with
the update of the internal state. Enocoro outputs 8-bit pseudorandom number per clock. Fig-
ure. 3.3 shows a structure of Enocoro.
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Figure. 3.3 Structure of Enocoro
　　　
(1) Update function
The update function of the state is called  function.  function is defined by the following
equations.
u0 = at0  s8[bt1]; (3.10)
u1 = at1  s8[bt4]; (3.11)
(v0; v1) = L(u0; u1); (3.12)
at+10 = v0  s8[bt6]; (3.13)
at+11 = v1  s8[bt16]; (3.14)
where, s8 is a non linear function and maps 8-bit input to 8-bit output. L is a linear function. u0,
u1, v0, and v1 are temporal variables. s8 is defined by the following equations.
y0 = s4[s4[x0]  4  s4[x1]  0xA]; (3.15)
y1 = s4[4  s4[x0]  s4[x1]  0x5]; (3.16)
s8[x] = (y0jjy1) <<< 1; (3.17)
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where, x0 and x1 represent upper 4-bit of input x and lower 4-bit of input x, respectively. Similarly,
y0 and y1 represent upper 4-bit of output y and lower 4-bit of output y, respectively. s4 is a non
linear function and maps 4-bit input to 4-bit output. s4 is defined by the following table.
s4[16] = f0x1; 0x3; 0x9; 0xA; 0x5; 0xE; 0x7; 0x2; 0xD; 0x0; 0xC; 0xF; 0x4; 0x8; 0x6; 0xBg:
(3.18)
Linear function L is defined by a matrix on GF(28).0BBBBBBBB@v0v1
1CCCCCCCCA = L(u0; u1) =
0BBBBBBBB@1 11 2
1CCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBB@u0u1
1CCCCCCCCA : (3.19)
The update function of the buer is called  function.  function is defined by the following
equations.
bt+1i = b
t
i 1; i , 0; 2; 5; 7; (3.20)
bt+10 = b
t
19  at0; (3.21)
bt+12 = b
t
1  bt3; (3.22)
bt+15 = b
t
4  bt5; (3.23)
bt+17 = b
t
6  bt15: (3.24)
(2) Output function
Output state a1 as a pseudorandom number.
(3) Initialization
In the initialization phase, the internal state is initialized by key, IV, and constant.
bi = Ki; 0  i < 10; (3.25)
bi+10 = Ii; 0  i < 8; (3.26)
bi+18 = Ci; 0  i < 2; (3.27)
a0 = C2; a1 = C3; (3.28)
where, Ki, Ii, and Ci are key byte, IV byte, and constant byte, respectively.
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3.3.4 SPONGENT
SPONGENT [19][20] is a lightweight hash function family designed by Bogdanov et al.
SPONGNET is based on a sponge construction. The sponge construction is a simple iterated
construction that takes a variable length input and generates a variable length output. The input
message is cut into a fixed length blocks and the block is taken as the input to the internal state.
The internal state is updated by a permutation. After that, a part of the internal state is returned as
a hash block. The internal state consists of two parts. One is rate r and the other is capacity c.
SPONGENT consists of two phases. The first phase is the absorbing phase. In the absorbing
phase, the internal state is initialized with 0. The input message is padded with a bit 1 and then
zeros are added until the message length is a multiple of the rate size. Then, the message is cut
into blocks that have r bits. The block is xored with the rate interleaved with the application of
the permutation. The internal state is taken as the input to the permutation and is updated with the
output of the permutation. This phase continues until all padded message blocks are xored with
the internal state.
The second phase is the squeezing phase. The rate are returned as a hash block interleaved with
the application of the permutation. The internal state is taken as the input to the permutation and
is updated with the output of the permutation. The squeezing phase continues until desired bits of
hash values are generated.
SPONGENT has five variations that consist of SPONGENT-88, SPONGENT-128,
SPONGENT-160, SPONGENT-224, and SPONGENT-256. The bit length of hash values
are 88-bit, 128-bit, 160-bit, 224-bit, and 256-bit respectively. SPONGENT-160 is a variation of
SPONGENT which has a 176-bit internal state. The internal state consists of a 160-bit capacity
and a 16-bit rate. The 16-bit message blocks are xored with the rate in the absorbing phase. Then,
the internal state is processed with the permutation  that consists of 90 times iteration of the
round function. Figure. 3.4 shows an overview of a structure of SPONGENT-160. Algorithm. 3.3
shows the permutation.
(1) sBoxLayer
In the sBoxLayer, 4-bit input and 4-bit output Sbox S is applied to all bits of the internal state.
– 41 –
　　　
0
m
1
m
2
m
N
h
1
h
H-1
h
H
Add Counter Add Counter
Bit permutation
4 bits
sboxLayer
pLayer
π π π π π π π
S S S S S S S S
　
　　
Figure. 3.4 Structure of SPONGENT-160
　　　
The Sbox is defined by the following table.
S (x) = f0xE; 0xD; 0xB; 0x0; 0x2; 0x1; 0x4; 0xF; 0x7; 0xA; 0x8; 0x5; 0x9; 0xC; 0x3; 0x6g:
(3.29)
(2) pLayer
In the pLayer, bit position j of the internal state is moved to bit position P( j).
P( j) = j  b=4 mod 175; if j 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; 174g; (3.30)
P( j) = 175; if j = 175: (3.31)
(3) lCounter
lCounter is a round constant and is generated by 7-bit LFSR. The LFSR is defined by the primitive
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Algorithm. 3.3 Permutation of SPONGENT-160
Input: the internal state STATE, the round constant lCounter
Output: the updated internal state
1: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,90 do
2: STATE = Reverse lCounter (i)  STATE  lCounter (i).
3: STATE = sBoxLayer (STATE).
4: STATE = pLayer (STATE).
5: end for
polynomial x7+x6+1 and the initial value is 0x1000101. Reverse lCounter is the value of lCounter
with reversed bit order.
3.3.5 PHOTON
PHOTON is a family of lightweight hash functions designed by Guo et al. PHOTON is based
on a sponge construction. The internal state consists of two parts. One is rate r and the other is
capacity c .
PHOTON consists of two phases. The first phase is the absorbing phase. In the absorbing
phase, the internal state is initialized with 0. The input message is padded with a bit 1 and then
zeros are added until the message length is a multiple of the rate size r. Then, the message is cut
into blocks that have r bits. The block is xored with the rate interleaved with the application of
the permutation. The internal state is taken as the input to the permutation and is updated with the
output of the permutation. This phase continues until all padded message blocks are xored with
the internal state.
The second phase is the squeezing phase. The rate is returned as a hash block interleaved with
the application of the permutation. The internal state is taken as the input to the permutation and
is updated with the output of the permutation. The squeezing phase continues until desired bits of
hash values are generated.
PHOTON has five variations that consist of PHOTON-88/20/16, PHOTON-128/16/16,
PHOTON-160/36/36, PHOTON-224/32/32, and PHOTON-256/32/32. The bit length of hash
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Figure. 3.5 Structure of PHOTON-160/36/36
　　　
values are 88-bit, 128-bit, 160-bit, 224-bit, and 256-bit, respectively. PHOTON-160/36/36 is
a variation of PHOTON which has a 196-bit internal state. The internal state consists of a
160-bit capacity and a 36-bit rate. The 36-bit message blocks are xored with the rate in the
absorbing phase. Then, the internal state is processed with the permutation P that consists of
12 times iteration of the round function. Figure. 3.5 shows a structure of PHOTON-160/36/36.
Algorithm. 3.4 shows the permutation. The state is treated as d  d matrix S that has s-bit cells.
(1) AddConstant
At vth round, a round constant RC(v) are xored with the internal state S [i; 0]. RC(v) is defined by
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Algorithm. 3.4 Permutation of PHOTON-160/36/36
Input: the internal state S, the round constant RC
Output: the updated internal state S
1: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,12 do
2: S = AddConstant(S, RC).
3: S = SubCells(S).
4: S = ShiftRows(S).
5: S =MixColumnsSerial(S).
6: end for
the following table.
RC(v) = [0x1; 0x3; 0x4; 0xE; 0xD; 0xB; 0x6; 0xC; 0x9; 0x2; 0x5; 0xA]: (3.32)
Then, another constant ICd(i) is xored with the internal state S [i; 0]. ICd(i) is defined by the
following table.
ICd = [0x0; 0x1; 0x2; 0x5; 0x3; 0x6; 0x4]: (3.33)
AddConstant layer is summarized with the following equation.
S 0[i; 0] = S [i; 0]  RC(v)  ICd(i); 0  i < 7: (3.34)
(2) SubCells
4-bit input and 4-bit output Sbox is applied to the internal state.
S 0[i; j] = S box(S [i; j]); 0  i; j < 7: (3.35)
Sbox is defined by the following table.
S box(16) = f0xC; 0x5; 0x6; 0xB; 0x9; 0x0; 0xA; 0xD; 0x3; 0xE; 0xF; 0x8; 0x4; 0x7; 0x1; 0x2g:
(3.36)
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(3) ShiftRows
Each row of the internal state rotates to the right. ShiftRows is defined by the following equation.
S 0[i; j] = S [i; ( j + i) mod d]; 0  i; j < 7: (3.37)
(4) MixColumnsSerial
Each column of the internal state is updated by applying the matrix A for 7 times. MixColumnsSe-
rial is defined by the following equation.
(S 0[0; j]; : : : ; S 0[6; j])T = A7× (S [0; j]; : : : ; S [6; j])T ; 0  j < 7; (3.38)
where, T means transposition. Matrix A is defined by the following equation.
A =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 4 6 1 1 6 4
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (3.39)
The irreducible polynomial is x4 + x + 1.
3.3.6 QUARK
QUARK [3][6] is a lightweight hash function family designed by Aumasson et al. QUARK is
based on a sponge construction. The internal state consists of two parts. One is rate r and the
other is capacity c .
QUARK consists of two phases. The first phase is the absorbing phase. In the absorbing phase,
the state is initialized with 0. The input message is padded with a bit 1 and then zeros are added
until the message length is a multiple of the rate size r. Then, the message is cut into blocks that
have r bits. The block is xored with the rate interleaved with the application of the permutation.
The internal state is taken as the input to the permutation and is updated with the output of the
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permutation. This phase continues until all padded message blocks are xored with the internal
state.
The second phase is the squeezing phase. The rate are returned as a hash block interleaved with
the application of the permutation. The internal state is taken as the input to the permutation and
is updated with the output of the permutation. The squeezing phase continues until desired bits of
hash values are generated.
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Figure. 3.6 Structure of D-QUARK
　　　
QUARK has three variations that consist of U-QUARK, D-QUARK, and S-QUARK. The bit
length of hash values are 128-bit, 160-bit, and 224-bit, respectively. D-QUARK is a variation of
QUARK which has a 176-bit internal state. The internal state consists of a 160-bit capacity and a
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Algorithm. 3.5 Round function of D-QUARK
Input: the LFSR L, the NFSRs X and Y
Output: the updated LFSR L, the NFSRs X and Y
1: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,704 do
2: hi = h(X;Y; L).
3: (X00; X
0
1; : : : ; X
0
79) = (X1; X2; : : : ; X79;Y0 + f (X) + h
i).
4: (Y 00;Y
0
1; : : : ;Y
0
79) = (Y1; Y2; : : : ; Y79; g(Y) + h
i).
5: (L00; L
0
1; : : : ; L
0
9) = (L1; L2; : : : ; L9; p(L)).
6: end for
16-bit rate. The 16-bit message blocks are xored with the rate in the absorbing phase. Then, the
internal state is processed with the permutation P that consists of 704 times iteration of the round
function. Figure. 3.6 shows an overview of a structure of D-QUARK.
The NFSRs are represented by X = (X0; X1; : : : ; X79) and Y = (Y0;Y1; : : : ; Y79). The bit length
of NFSRs are 80-bit. The LFSR is represented by L = (L0; L1; : : : ; L9). The bit length of LFSR is
10-bit.
(1) Round function
The round function consists of Non-linear Boolian functions f ; g; h, and a linear Boolian function
p. Algorithm. 3.5 shows the round function.
The output of the function f is defined by the following term.
f (X) = X0 + X11 + X18 + X27 + X36 + X42 + X47 + X58 + X64 + X67 + X71 + X71X79+
X42X47 + X11X19 + X58X67X71 + X27X36X42 + X11X36X58X79 + X42X47X67X71+
X19X27X71X79 + X47X58X67X71X79 + X11X19X27X36X42 + X27X36X42X47X58X67:
(3.40)
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The output of the function g is defined by the following term.
g(Y) = Y0 + Y9 + Y20 + Y25 + Y38 + Y44 + Y47 + Y69 + Y63 + Y67 + Y69+
Y69Y78 + Y44Y47 + Y9Y19 + Y54Y67Y69 + Y25Y38Y44 + Y9Y38Y54Y78 + Y44Y47Y67Y69+
Y19Y25Y69Y78 + Y47Y54Y67Y69Y78 + Y9Y19Y25Y38Y44 + Y25Y38Y44Y47Y54Y67: (3.41)
The output of the function h is defined by the following term.
h(X;Y; L) = L0 + X1 + Y2 + X5 + Y12 + Y24 + X35 + X40 + X48 + Y55 + Y61+
X72 + Y79 + Y4X68 + X57X68 + X68Y79 + Y4X35X57+
Y4X57X68 + Y4X57Y79 + L0X35X57Y79 + L0X35: (3.42)
The output of the function p is defined by the following term.
p(L) = L0 + L3: (3.43)
3.4 Implementation Platform
3.4.1 FPGA
FPGA is a configurable integrated circuit. FPGA consists of an array of programmable logic
blocks, reconfigurable interconnections, and I/O pad. The logic block is configured to perform
combinational functions. The logic block consists of several logical cells and memory elements,
such as FFs, and blocks of memory. The logical cell is called Slice or ALM. The slice consists of
two or four cells. The cell mainly consists of 4-input LUT and a FF. In these days, some FPGA
uses 6-input LUTs.
The behavior of the FPGA is defined by a designer using HDL, such as Verilog-HDL, and
VHDL. A netlist is generated by a design tool. The netlist is fitted to the FPGA by a process
called place and route. The process is done by a place and route tool. After the process, a binary
file is generated. The file defines the behavior of the FPGA and is transferred to the FPGA.
Reconfigurations are done by changing the functionalities of the cells and the interconnections of
the blocks.
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3.4.2 ASIC
ASIC is an integrated circuit that is customized for a single behavior. The development process of
ASIC is similar to that of FPGA. A designer describes a functionality of ASIC using HDL to define
the behavior of ASIC. This design is called RTL design. Then, a designer verifies functionality of
the RTL design using a software tool. This process is called logic simulation. After that, the RTL
design is transformed into a lower level construction by logic synthesis using standard cell library
that describes characteristics of basic gates, such as 2-input AND, 2-input OR, and invertor. The
characteristics of the standard cells are dierent according to the manufactures of ASIC. After the
synthesis, a gate level netlist is generated. The gate level netlist contains a set of the standard cells
and electrical connections between the standard cells. The gate level netlist is taken as the input
to a placement and route tool. The tool tries to find a placement of the standard cells and physical
connections of the standard cells taking into consideration of several constrains in terms of area
and time. Finally, the photomask of the circuit is released for fabrication.
3.5 Comparison Metrics for Hardware Performance
To compare hardware performance of the circuits using a single value, previous studies have used
a product of dierent kinds of metrics, such as area requirements, power consumption, energy, the
number of clock cycles, and the operating frequency. However, the important metric is dierent
according to the devices. For example, in the case of an active tag, the energy is an important
metric. Since the tag has a battery, the life of the battery is aected by the energy. In the case of
a passive tag, the power consumption is an important metric. The tag does not operate when the
power consumption of the tag exceeds the received power from a reader.
We deduce that a triple of parameters is suitable for performance evaluation for a passive tag.
A triple consists of area requirements, power consumption, and the number of clock cycles. The
power consumption of the circuit is given by W. The power consumption aects to the maximum
read distance of the tag. The area requirements of the circuit are given by GE. The area require-
ments aects to the cost of the tag. The number of clock cycles does not depend on the clock
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frequency. The number of clock cycles aects to the operating time of the tag. This triple allows
calculation of a product metric such as the energy.
3.5.1 Area Requirements
Area requirements indicate an amount of silicon needed to implement the design of a circuit.
From an economic point of view, the amount of silicon is an important issue since the production
cost increases in accordance with the size of the integrated circuits. The area requirements of the
circuit are typically measured by m2. However, this metric depends on a fablication process of
the circuit. Since GE is independent from the fablication process, this is a more usable metric.
GE is calculated by dividing the area requirements by the area occupied with a two-input NAND
gate.
3.5.2 Operating Time
There are mainly two metrics to measure time related requirement. One is throughput and the
other is clock cycles. Throughput is measured in bit per second manner and is calculated by
dividing the product of the bit size of the output and the operating frequency by the number of
clock cycles. Usually, the throughput is calculated under the condition that the circuit operates at
the maximum frequency. The circuit achieves high throughput as the operating frequency is high.
However, the operating frequency is low in the case of tags. Therefore, the throughput is not a
suitable measure for the tags.
The second one is the number of clock cycles needed to execute cryptographic process including
data loading and storing. This is a simple measure and does not depend on another metric such as
the operating frequency. The operating frequency of the tags diers from the kind of tags or the
application of the tag. Therefore, the number of clock cycles is a suitable measure for the tag.
3.5.3 Power Consumption
The operating power is supplied to a passive tag by a reader over the air interface. Weak electro
magnetic wave is emitted by the reader’s antenna and is received by the tag’s antenna. The tag’s
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antenna induces a voltage from the electromagnetic wave. This voltage depends on the distance
between the reader and the tag. In the case of the RFID system operating in UHF band, the power
received by the tag is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the tag and
the reader. The maximum read distance of the tag is aected by the power consumption of the
tag [39].
Ptag =   Preader Gt Gr=(4d=)2; (3.44)
where, Ptag is the power received by the tag. Preader is the power transmitted by the reader.
 is Preader-to-Ptag power conversion eciency.  reflects the power reception eciency of mi-
crowaves or the rectification conversion eciency. Gt andGr are the free space gain of the reader’s
antenna and tag’s antenna, respectively.  is the carrier frequency wavelength. d is the distance
between the tag and the reader. The maximum read distance of the tag aects the application of
the tag.
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Part III
Selection and Implementation of
Cryptographic Components

Chapter 4
Hardware Architecture of
Cryptographic Algorithm for RFID
Tag
4.1 Introduction
To protect the tag from the security and the privacy risks, tag authentication protocols based on
cryptographic algorithms have been studied [51]. To the best of our knowledge, hash functions
and pseudorandom number generators are widely used as the cryptographic algorithm.
We deduce that the important metrics for the tag are cost, maximum read distance, and operating
time. These physical metrics are directly aected by hardware performance of a cryptographic
circuit. The cost is aected by the area requirements of the circuit. The maximum read distance
is aected by the power consumption of the circuit. The operating time is aected by the number
of clock cycles needed to complete the cryptographic process in the circuit.
As a previous result, Saarinen et al. have studied some requirements for the cryptographic algo-
rithms for the tag from hardware performance of the cryptographic circuit [96]. They have picked
up EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 [34] and have studied that some lightweight hash functions.
They have mentioned that the lightweight hash functions they have studied were inappropriate for
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a tag and the lightweight stream ciphers might be useful for a tag. However, they have not taken
care of the security strength. They have evaluated the number of clock cycles needed to generate
16-bit output. We deduce that this bit length is too small to be applied in a real world as a response
of a tag collides with another response of another tag with a probability of 1=28.
The hardware performance are largely aected by hardware architecture of the cryptographic
circuit. Thus, we study hardware architecture, which is suitable for the tag, of the cryptographic
algorithms. We focus on lightweight hash functions and lightweight stream ciphers that are widely
used for a cryptographic algorithm for tag authentication.
4.2 Basic Hardware Architectures
There are three major hardware architectures. Namely, the serialized architecture, the parallel
architecture, and the sequential architecture.
Serialized architecture Parallel architecture
FF
F F F F F F
MUX
input
output
F
M
U
Xinput
output
FF FFFF
　　　　
Figure. 4.1 Serialized architecture and parallel architecture
　　　
4.2.1 Parallel Architecture
Figure. 4.1 shows an overview of the parallel architecture. In Figure. 4.1, FF, F, and MUX mean
a register, a function, and a multiplexer, respectively. The parallel architecture is characterized
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by the property that all bits of data stored in registers are updated by the functions at the same
time. The parallel architecture performs one round function of the cryptographic process within
one clock cycle. It is also possible to perform several round functions within one clock cycle by
implementing the round function several times. The parallel architecture achieves small number
of clock cycles while the area requirements of the circuit are slightly large.
4.2.2 Serialized Architecture
Figure. 4.1 shows an overview of the serialized architecture. The serialized architecture is char-
acterized by the property that data bits are stored in register chain and are updated by the function
in a bit or byte wise fashion. The serialized architecture performs a fraction of the round func-
tion within one clock cycle. Namely, it takes several number of clock cycles to process one round
function. Since the control circuit will be more complex, the area occupied with the control circuit
will increase. While this architecture achieves low area requirements of the circuit, the number of
clock cycles are large.
4.2.3 Sequential Architecture
4.2.3.1 Power Reduction Method
One of the important physical metrics for the tag is the maximum read distance. The maximum
read distance is aected by the power consumption of the tag. Generally speaking, there is a linear
relationship between the power consumption of the circuit and the number of signal toggle [28].
Ptotal = Ptoggle CL  V2dd  f + Ileak  Vdd; (4.1)
where, Ptoggle, CL, Vdd, f , and Ileak are number of the signal toggles, loading capacity, power
supply voltage, clock frequency, and a leakage current, respectively. Therefore, reduction of the
number of the signal toggles leads power reduction of the circuit.
4.2.3.2 Sequential Architecture
As the cryptographic circuit is connected to another circuit in the tag, a buer will be used to store
data that are taken as the input to the cryptographic circuit and are returned as output from the
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cryptographic circuit temporaly. Usually the buer stores data only when the data are transferred
between the cryptographic circuit and the outer circuit.
As the buer is not used when the internal state is updated with the output of the update func-
tion, the buer can be used as a temporal register to store a part of the internal state. By storing
a part of the internal state in the buer, the internal state can be updated with the output of the
update function sequentially. We deduce that a hardware architecture updating the internal state
sequentially can achieve low number of the signal toggles.
LFSR
data update function
output
buffer
counter
counter update 
function 
Figure. 4.2 Sequential Architecture
Figure. 4.2 shows an overview of the sequential architecture. In the figure, the counter is a
register to store counter value. The counter update function is the update function of the counter
value. The output of the counter is taken as the control signal to the LFSR and the buer.
We describe update steps of the internal state. First, the output of the update function is taken
as the input to the buer. Second, an M-bit block of LFSR is shifted to the right. Here, M is the
size of the buer. This step is repeated until all bits of LFSR shift to the right. Finally, data stored
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in the buer are taken as the input to the leftmost M-bit of LFSR.
While this architecture is serialized-based architecture, the sequential architecture is dierent
from the serialized architecture in the following sense. While all bits of data stored in FFs in the
serialized architecture shift simultaneously, data stored in FFs in the sequential architecture shift
sequentially.
Design of control circuit
As shown in Figure. 4.2, LFSR and the buer are controlled by the counter value. Generally
speaking, the counter value is incremented every clock. The counter is initialized with 0 and
incremented by 1. The signal line of the counter has usually multiple bit width while it depends
on the number of processing steps. Therefore, there is a concern about glitch on the counter. Glitch
is an unnecessary transition of the signal and it causes increasing of the power consumption.
We have designed and implemented a simple counter described above. Then, we have simulated
the behavior of the signal toggle of the circuit. We have designed the counter in Verilog-HDL. We
have used Synopsys Design Compiler (Version C-2009.06-SP5) and TSMC 90 nm high perfor-
mance library to generate a netlist. We have used Simvision version 05.83-s015 to simulate the
netlist.
cnt[3]
cnt[2]
cnt[1]
cnt[0]
Figure. 4.3 Glithces on the signal line of the counter
Figure. 4.3 shows detail behavior of the signal line of the counter switching from 11 to 12.
The bit width of the signal line are 4 and these lines are indicated by cnt[3], cnt[2], cnt[1], and
cnt[0] from high order bit. The signal level of the signal lines changes one by one with time delay.
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Therefore, the counter value does not change from 11 to 12 directly. The counter value changes
through transitional values, such as 15, and 13. From these results, it is clear that glitches occur
in the signal line of the counter.
If a glitch occurs in the signal line of the counter, glitches occure in the datapaths. This is
because that datapaths in the sequential architecture are controlled by the counter value. Since
it is known that power consumption caused by glitches are large, the power consumption of the
cryptographic circuit will be large [70].
Thus, we design a counter that does not cause glitches on the signal line of the counter. As
shown in Figure. 4.3, we know that the signal level of the counters changes one by one. This
means that the counter value changes through several steps and the Hamming distance between
two continuous steps is 1. Therefore, we design a cyclic counter. This counter has a property that
the Hamming Distance between two continuous values are always 1. As this counter does not
have opportunity to take temporal values, we can reduce glitch occurrences on the signal lines of
the counter.
We show an example of the counter on Table 4.1. The bit width is 4 and the number of steps
are 14. If the number of steps equal to 2n (n is the bit width of the counter), the Gray code can be
used. Gray code is a binary code and two continuous values dier only 1 bit [42]. This property
is similar to the characteristic that our counter has.
4.3 Hardware Architecture of Lightweight Cryptographic
Algorithms
The cryptographic circuit consists of FFs and combinational logics. FFs are used to store the
internal data. The combinational logics are used for transform functions. When we focus on the
lightweight cryptographic algorithms, a large part of the area requirements of the cryptographic
circuits are occupied with FFs and these areas are irreducible. Most of the lightweight crypto-
graphic algorithms adopt transform functions that can be implemented with a few combinational
logics. On the other hand, FFs are area-consuming components. Therefore, area requirements of
the lightweight cryptography will not drastically be dierent according to the hardware architec-
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Table 4.1 Counter with constant Hamming Distance
Round Counter value
# bit
0 0000
1 0001
2 0011
3 0111
4 0101
5 1101
6 1001
7 1011
8 1010
9 1000
10 1100
11 0100
12 0110
13 0010
ture.
On the other hand, to ensure the security of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms, large
round number, which defines the updating times of the internal state with the update function,
is likely to be adopted. When the parallel architecture is used to implement a lightweight cryp-
tographic algorithm, one clock cycle is needed to update all bits of the internal state one time.
When the serialized architecture is used to implement the lightweight cryptographic algorithm,
more number of clock cycles are required to update all bits of the internal state one time since
only a fraction of the round function are implemented. Furthermore, when the sequential archi-
tecture is used to implement the lightweight cryptographic algorithm, much more number of clock
cycles will be required to update all bits of the internal state one time since the internal state are
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updated sequentially. Therefore, the number of clock cycles largely depends on the hardware
architecture.
Thus, we study hardware architecture that is suitable for implementation of the lightweight
cryptographic algorithms on a tag based on hardware performance in the sense of the number of
clock cycles. The number of clock cycles can be evaluated without implementing the lightweight
cryptographic algorithms.
4.3.1 Hardware Architecture for Lightweight Hash Functions
Table 4.2 Hardware evaluation results of the lightweight hash functions
Algorithms Architecture Clock cycles
Hash functions SPONGENT-160 Parallel 1534
SPONGENT-160 [21] Serialized 75240
SPONGENT-160 [21] Sequential 902880
D-QUARK Parallel 1500
D-QUARK [3] Serialized 13380
D-QUARK [3] Sequential 160516
PHOTON-160/36/36 Parallel 106
PHOTON-160/36/36 [48] Serialized 11998
PHOTON-160/36/36 [48] Sequential 167842
Keccak Parallel 64
Keccak [62] Serialized 1240
Keccak [62] Sequential 121240
Table 4.2 shows evaluation results of the lightweight hash functions in the sense of the number
of clock cycles. Since the number of clock cycles are aected by bit length of the message and the
hash value, we evaluate the number of clock cycles needed to input a 160-bit message and output
a 160-bit hash value.
The serialized architecture of the lightweight hash functions requires a large number of clock
cycles [76]. Since the lightweight hash functions take a short message block as the input and
returns a short hash block as the output, the numbers of the message block and the hash block
are large. The internal state is updated by the round function for defined times interleaved with
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the message block input and the hash block output. Since only a few components of the update
functions are implemented, the circuit processes a few bits of the internal state per clock. When
the lightweight hash functions are implemented with the sequential architecture, the internal state
shifts sequentially, and then a few bits of the internal state are updated with the update function.
Therefore, the lightweight hash functions implemented with the serialized architecture and the
sequential architecture take a large number of clock cycles.
From our evaluation results, 902880 clock cycles are required to generate 160-bit hash value
with SPONGENT-160 implemented with the sequential architecture. As an IC designed for a
tag in a market operates with 125 kHz clock signal [9], it takes about 9 seconds to finish the
cryptographic process.
4.3.2 Hardware Architecture for Lightweight Stream Ciphers
Table 4.3 Hardware evaluation results of the lightweight stream ciphers
Algorithms Architecture Clock cycles
Stream ciphers Grain-80 Parallel 82
Sequential 299
Trivium Parallel 167
Sequential 1595
Enocoro-80 Parallel 90
Sequential 418
Table 4.3 shows evaluation results of the lightweight stream ciphers in the sense of the number
of clock cycles. Since the number of clock cycles are aected by bit length of pseudorandom
number, we evaluate the number of clock cycles needed to output 160-bit pseudorandom number.
As the lightweight stream ciphers are LFSR-based algorithms, the parallel architecture and the
serialized architecture for the lightweight stream cipher are the same. When the lightweight stream
ciphers are implemented with the sequential architecture, the internal state shifts sequentially, and
then a few bits of the internal state are updated with the update function. However, the lightweight
stream ciphers still achieve high speed performance. The lightweight stream ciphers consist of the
initialization process, which does not generate output, and the pseudorandom number generation
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process that generates output every round. Therefore, the initialization process takes dominant
part of the number of clock cycles. On the other hand, as the algorithms generate pseudorandom
bits every round after the initialization process, these algorithms achieve high speed performance.
4.4 Conclusion
Hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithms in the sense of operating time depends
on hardware architecture. This operating time will restrict applications of the tag. Therefore, we
have studied hardware architecture of the cryptographic algorithm for a tag from a viewpoint of
the operating time. We focus on the lightweight hash functions and the lightweight stream ciphers
that are widely used for tag authentication protocols. We have picked up the parallel architecture,
the serialized architecture, and the sequential architecture.
From our evaluation results, it has been cleared that the number of clock cycles dier 600 times
according to the hardware architecture. Our results show that the parallel architecture seems suit-
able for the lightweight hash functions. The parallel architecture and the sequential architecture
seems suitable for the lightweight stream ciphers.
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Chapter 5
Selection of Cryptographic Algorithm
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5.1 Introduction
Hardware performance of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms in the sense of the number of
clock cycles largely depends on the hardware architecture of the lightweight cryptographic algo-
rithms. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we study hardware architectures of the lightweight cryptographic
algorithms. A hardware performance of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms in the sense of
the number of clock cycles needed to complete the cryptographic process can be evaluated with-
out implementation of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms. On the other hand, hardware
performance of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms in the sense of area requirements and
the number of signal toggles, which is a main cause of power consumption, can be evaluated after
implementing these algorithms.
The hardware performance of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms depend not only the
algorithms but also evaluation tools, such as platform, compiler, and standard cell library. As
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previous studies, the lightweight block ciphers have been targeted and comparative studies of them
in the sense of hardware performance have been studied. In the most recent work of Kerckho et
al., area, power consumption, throughput, and energy of 6 block ciphers have been evaluated [58].
Batina et al. have reported area, power consumption, and energy of 11 block ciphers [16]. These
studies focus on a fair comparison of AES [80] to recently developed lightweight block ciphers.
Hardware performance of some cryptographic algorithms achieving dierent security strengths
has been discussed in [41].
However, these studies have not taken care of the interface of the cryptographic circuit. The
data width of the interface has set arbitrarily. As the cryptographic circuit in the tag is connected
to another circuit to realize the authentication process, we deduce that it is important to design the
interface considering the system that uses the circuit.
In addition, when we focus on the lightweight hash functions and the lightweight stream ci-
phers that are widely used as a cryptographic algorithm on the tag authentication protocols, a
comparative analysis of these algorithms based on hardware performance has not been studied.
Thus, to select the cryptographic algorithms that are suitable for a tag, we implement and evaluate
hardware performance of the lightweight hash functions and the lightweight stream ciphers.
5.2 Design of Interface for Cryptographic Circuit
5.2.1 Overview of RFID Tag
Figure. 5.1 shows an overview of a typical RFID tag. To simplify the figure, only modules in the
data path are shown. The analog part performs the demodulation of the received data and extracts
the power from the RF field mainly. The analog power block extracts the energy from the RF field
and supplies the power for the blocks. The analog clock block generates clock signals needed for
the digital processing. The digital part performs the encoding/decoding of the data format and
cryptographic process mainly.
Since the input data and the output data of the cryptographic module are used in the other mod-
ule, these data are stored in SRAM and are accessed from several modules. To take low-area
requirements and achieve low-power consumption of the tag, we have selected SRAM parameter-
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ized by a datapath width of 8-bits that is the smallest datapath width to the best of our knowledge.
If the datapath width is large, the power consumption of the tag is predicted to be large due to
increase of active signals.
5.2.2 Interface of the Cryptographic Circuit
Since the cryptographic circuit is connected to SRAM, we design the interface of the crypto-
graphic circuit based on the SRAM parameterized by a datapath width of 8-bit. Namely, key, IV,
and message are cut into 8-bit blocks and the blocks are taken as the input to the cryptographic
circuit one by one. One block is taken as the input to the cryptographic circuit within one clock
cycle. Similarly, the 8-bit pseudorandom numbers or 8-bit hash value are returned from the cryp-
tographic circuit within one clock cycle.
5.3 Implementation of the Lightweight Stream Cipher
5.3.1 Grain
5.3.1.1 Parallel Architecture
NFSR LFSR
output
12 bits
4 bits
6 bits
g f
h
Figure. 5.2 Hardware architecture of Grain based on parallel architecture
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Figure. 5.2 shows the hardware architecture of Grain based on the parallel architecture. The
main part consists of registers and update functions. A 160-bit register is used to store 160-bit
internal state. The register consists of a NFSR and a LFSR. The size of NFSR is 80-bit and the
size of LFSR is 80-bit. The update function consists of f ; g, and h functions. f function consists
of XOR operations. g and h functions consist of AND and XOR operations. NFSR is updated
with a value that is generated by xoring the outputs of g function and LFSR. LFSR is updated
with the output of f function.
At the beginning of the initialization process, NFSR is initialized with key, and LFSR is initial-
ized with IV and constants. Then, the registers are updated with the output of the update functions.
In the initialization process, pseudorandom numbers are not returned.
After the initialization process, the pseudorandom number generating process begins. In this
process, the output of h function is returned as pseudorandom numbers, and the internal state is
continuously updated with the update functions.
5.3.1.2 Sequential Architecture
g
f
buffer LFSR
M
U
X
8 bits
h
output
NFSR
Figure. 5.3 Hardware architecture of Grain based on sequential architecture
Figure. 5.3 shows the hardware architecture of Grain based on the sequential architecture. We
describe the update steps of the internal state in the initialization process. LFSR is represented as
(s0; s1; : : : ; s79). NFSR is represented as (b0; b1; : : : ; b79).
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1. Move data from (s0; s1; : : : ; s15) to the buer．
2. LFSR shifts 16-bit blocks one by one per clock．
3. Update the least significant 16-bit (s64; s65; : : : ; s79) with data generated by xoring LFSR,
the buer, and the output of h function.
4. Store the input data to NFSR (s64; s65; : : : ; s79) in the buer. The data is generated by xoring
NFSR, the buer, and the output of h function.
5. NFSR shifts 16-bit blocks one by one per clock.
6. Move data, which are stored in the buer at Step.4., to the least significant 16-bit of NFSR
(b64; b65; : : : ; b79).
In the pseudorandom number generating process, 16-bit pseudorandom number is stored in the
buer and is output every 8-bit. After that, the same processes described above are done. Table 4.1
shows the designated counter in the control circuit for Grain.
5.3.2 Trivium
5.3.2.1 Parallel Architecture
LFSR
output
3 bits 3 bits
LFSR
3 bits
LFSR
g g g
fff
Figure. 5.4 Hardware architecture of Trivium based on parallel architecture
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Figure. 5.4 shows the hardware architecture of Trivium based on the parallel architecture. The
main part consists of registers and update functions. A 282-bit register is used to store 282-bit
internal state. The register consists of three LFSRs. The sizes of LFSRs are 93-bit, 84-bit, and
111-bit, respectively. The update function consists of f and g functions. f function consists of
XOR and AND operations. g function consists of XOR operations.
At the beginning of the initialization process, LFSRs are initialized with key, IV, and constants.
Then, the registers are updated with the output of the update function. In the initialization pro-
cess, pseudorandom numbers are not returned. After the initialization process, the pseudorandom
number generating process begins. In this process, data generated by xoring the outputs of g func-
tions is returned as pseudorandom numbers, and the internal state is continuously updated with
the update functions.
5.3.2.2 Sequential Architecture
The internal state consist of three LFSRs having dierent bit lengths (s1; s2; : : : ; s93),
(s94; s95; : : : ; s177), and (s178; s179; : : : ; s288). We call these LFSRs LFSR0, LFSR1, and
LFSR2 shortly. We show the hardware architecture of Trivium based on the sequential architec-
ture in Figure. 5.5. Similar to Figure. 5.3, the initial input to LFSRs are not shown. We desribe
the update steps.
1. Move data stored in (s110; : : : ; s125) to the buer.
2. Shift (s94; : : : ; s109) 16-bit.
3. Update (s94; : : : ; s109)．
4. Overwrite (s78; : : : ; s93) with (s62; : : : ; s77)．
These steps are repeated in the order of LFSR1, LFSR0, and LFSR2. Finally, the date stored in
the buer are taken as the input to (s126; : : : ; s141).
In the pseudorandom number generating process, a 16-bit pseudorandom number is stored in
the buer and is output every 8-bit. After that, the same processes described above are done.
Table 5.1 shows the designated counter in the control circuit for Trivium. The counter has
the charactaristic that the Hamming Distance between two continuous steps are always 1. As
the internal state of the Trivium is larger than that of Grain, the number of steps are also larger.
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Table 5.1 Counter for control circuit of Trivium
Round Counter value
# bit
0 00000
1 00001
2 00011
3 00111
4 00101
5 01101
6 01001
7 01011
8 01111
9 11111
10 10111
11 10011
12 11011
13 11001
14 11101
15 10101
16 10001
17 10000
18 10010
19 11010
20 01010
21 00010
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Figure. 5.5 Hardware architecture of Trivium based on sequential architecture
Therefore, we increase the bit width of the conter.
5.3.3 Enocoro
5.3.3.1 Parallel Architecture
Figure. 5.6 shows the hardware architecture of Enocoro based on the parallel architecture. The
main part consists of registers and update function. A 176-bit register is used to store 176-bit
internal state. The register consists of LFSR and FF. The sizes of LFSR and FF are 160-bit and
16-bit. LFSR is updated with a linear function that takes 8-bit of FF as an input. FF is updated
with the sbox and the linear function. Sbox is 8-bit input and 8-bit output substitution function,
and it takes 8-bit of LFSR as the input. The sbox consists of four 4-bit input and 4-bit output
substitution function s4, and linear functions. The s4 block is implemented by a look-up table.
The sbox block is implemented 4 times in parallel. The linear function is implemented using XOR
and bit-wise shift operations.
At the beginning of the initialization process, LFSR and FF are initialized with key, IV, and con-
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Figure. 5.6 Hardware architecture of Enocoro based on parallel architecture
stants. Then, the registers are updated with the output of the update function. In the initialization
process, pseudorandom numbers are not returned. After the initialization process, the pseudoran-
dom number generating process begins. In this process, 8-bit of FF are returned as pseudorandom
numbers, and the internal state is continuously updated with the update function.
5.3.3.2 Sequential Architecture
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Figure. 5.7 Hardware architecture of Enocoro based on sequential architecture
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Figure. 5.7 shows the hardware architecture of Enocoro based on the sequential architecture.
We describe update sequence in the following. (b19; b18; : : : ; b0) and (a1; a0) indicate LFSR and
FF, respectively.
1. Store the data generated by xoring b19, b18, and a0 in the buer.
2. Update (a1; a0)
3. (b19; b18; : : : ; b0) shifts 16-bit blocks one by one per clock.
4. Move the data stored in the buer to b0 and b1
In the pseudorandom number generating phase, 16-bit pseudorandom number are stored in the
buer, and are output 8-bit per clock. After that, the same processes described above are done.
Table 4.1 shows the designated counter in the control circuit for Enocoro.
5.4 Implementation of the Lightweight Hash Function
5.4.1 SPONGENT-160
Figure. 5.8 shows the hardware architecture of SPONGENT-160 based on the parallel architecture.
A 16-bit buer register is used to store output blocks. A 176-bit register is used to store 176-bit
internal state. Data stored in the register is taken as the input to the round function. The round
function consists of xor block, sbox block, and player block. The xor block xors 7-bit round
constants and the 7-bit of the internal state. The sbox block substitutes the internal state by 4-bit
input and 4-bit output sbox. The sbox is implemented by a look-up table. The sbox is implemented
44 times in parallel. The player function performs bit-wise permutation and is implemented with
wires.
At the beginning of the initialization process, the registers are initialized with 0s. The register
is updated with the output of the round function. In the squeezing process, hash value is produced.
16-bit of the register is returned as the hash block. Since an 8-bit datapath is used, the 16-bit hash
block is stored in the buer. Then, the hash block is output from the buer. Two clock cycles are
needed to output the hash block. The permutation process requires 90 clock cycles to absorb one
message block or squeeze one hash value block.
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Figure. 5.8 Hardware architecture of SPONGENT-160 based on parallel architecture
5.4.2 D-QUARK
Figure. 5.9 shows the hardware architecture of D-QUARK based on the parallel architecture. The
main part consists of buer, register, and permutation function. A 16-bit buer is used to store
output blocks. A 176-bit register is used to store 176-bit internal state. The register consists of
three parts i.e. two NFSRs and a LFSR. The size of NFSR is 80-bit and the size of LFSR is
16-bit. The permutation function consists of f ; g, and h functions. These functions consist of
AND and XOR operations. A NFSR is updated with a value generated by xoring the output of g
and h functions. The other NFSR is updated with a value generated by xoring output of f and h
functions. Data stored in the register is taken as an input to the round function.
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Figure. 5.9 Hardware architecture of D-QUARK based on parallel architecture
At the beginning of the initialization process, the registers are initialized with 0s. The register
is updated with the output of the permutation. In the squeezing process, hash value is produced.
16-bit of the register are returned as the hash block. Since an 8-bit datapath is used, the hash block
is stored in the buer. Then the hash block is returned from the buer. The permutation process
requires 88 clock cycles to absorb one message block or squeeze one hash value block.
5.4.3 PHOTON-160/36/36
Figure. 5.10 shows the hardware architecture of PHOTON-160/36/36 based on the parallel archi-
tecture. The main part consists of buer, register, and permutation function. A 36-bit buer is
used to store output blocks. A 196-bit register is used to store 196-bit internal state. Data stored
in the register are taken as an input to the round function. The round function consists of add
constant block, subcell block, shiftrow block, and mixcolumnserial block. The add constant block
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Figure. 5.10 Hardware architecture of PHOTON-160/36/36 based on parallel architecture
xors 4-bit round constant, 4-bit constant, and 4-bit state. The round constant block is implemented
5 times in parallel. The subcells block substitutes the state by 4-bit input and 4-bit output sbox.
The sbox is implemented 49 times in parallel. The shiftrow block rotates all 4-bit states to the left.
The mixcolumserial block updates all columns of the states linearly.
At the beginning of the initialization process, the registers are initialized with 0s. The register
is updated with the output of the round function. In the squeezing process, hash value is produced.
36-bit of the register is returned as the hash block. Since an 8-bit datapath is used, the 36-bit hash
value is stored in the buer. Then the hash value is output from the buer. Five clock cycles are
needed to output the hash block. The permutation process requires 12 clock cycles to absorb one
message block or squeeze one hash value block.
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5.4.4 Keccak
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Figure. 5.11 Hardware architecture of Keccak based on parallel architecture
Figure. 5.11 shows the hardware architecture of Keccak based on the parallel architecture. The
main part consists of register, buer, and permutation function. A 1600-bit register is used to store
the internal state. Data stored in the register is taken as an input to the round function.
The round function consists of  block,  block,  block,  block, and  block.  block consists
of bit-wise permutation and XOR operation.  block is implemented 64 times in parallel.  block
consists of bit-wise permutation.  block consists of bit-wise permutation and XOR operation.
 block is implemented 64 times in parallel.  block consists of bit-wise AND, NOT, and XOR
operations.  block is implemented 64 times in parallel.  block consists of XOR operations.
At the beginning of the initialization process, the registers are initialized with 0s. The register
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is updated with the output of the round function. In the squeezing phase, hash value is produced.
A part of the register is output as the hash block. Since an 8-bit datapath is used, the hash block
is stored in the buer and is output from the buer. The permutation process requires 24 clock
cycles to absorb a message block or squeeze a hash block.
5.5 Hardware Performance Evaluation
5.5.1 Performance Evaluation on FPGA
Our designs of the algorithms are described in Verilog-HDL. We have synthesized the circuits
using Xilinx*1 SPARTAN-6 FPGA XC6SLX45 device and Xilinx ISE 12.4.
Table 5.2 Hardware evaluation results of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms on FPGA
Algorithms Architecture Area (Slice) Time (Clock cycles)
Stream ciphers Grain Parallel 187 82
Sequential 155 299
Trivium Parallel 223 167
Sequential 153 1595
Enocoro Parallel 148 90
Sequential 144 418
Hash functions SPONGENT-160 Parallel 88 1534
SPONGENT-160 [19] Sequential - 902880
D-QUARK Parallel 129 1500
D-QUARK [3] Sequential - 160516
PHOTON-160/36/36 Parallel 355 106
PHOTON-160/36/36 [48] Sequential - 167842
Keccak Parallel 734 64
Keccak [62] Sequential - 121240
Table 5.2 shows evaluation results of the lightweight stream ciphers and the lightweight hash
functions on FPGA. We have not implemented the lightweight hash functions based on the se-
*1 Xilinx, Spartan and ISE are registered trademarks of Xilinx, Inc.
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quential architecture and the serialized architecture since these architectures seem not suitable for
the tag from a viewpoint of the number of clock cycles.
5.5.2 Performance Evaluation on ASIC
We have synthesized the circuits using Synopsys*2 Design Compiler*3(Version C-2009.06-SP-5)
and TSMC*4 90 nm process standard cell library. To evaluate the number of signal toggles, we
have simulated the circuits’ behavior for 100 random test vectors and have generated VCD files.
We have calculated a population mean and a population standard by 99 % reliable section, and
then we have predicted the number of signal toggles by three sigma limit.
Table 5.3 Hardware evaluation results of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms on ASIC
Algorithms Architecture Area Clock cycles Signal toggle
(GE) ( ] toggle)
Stream ciphers Grain Parallel 3470 82 108
Sequential 3900 299 99
Sequential (dedicated counter) 3850 299 43
Trivium Parallel 3810 167 110
Sequential 4050 1595 42
Sequential (dedicated counter) 4130 1595 32
Enocoro Parallel 3510 90 92
Sequential 3640 418 46
Sequential (dedicated counter) 3660 418 37
Hash functions SPONGENT-160 Parallel 2980 1534 141
D-QUARK Parallel 3064 1500 182
PHOTON-160/36/36 Parallel 7075 106 184
Keccak Parallel 32400 60 1192
Table 5.3 shows evaluation results of the lightweight stream ciphers and the lightweight hash
functions on ASIC. We have not implemented the lightweight hash functions based on the sequen-
*2 Synopsys is a registered trademark of Synopsys. Inc.
*3 Design Compiler is a product name of Synopsys. Inc.
*4 TSMC is a registered trademark of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited.
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tial architecture and the serialized architecture since these architectures seem not suitable for the
tag from a viewpoint of the number of clock cycles.
5.6 Discussion
We implement the lightweight stream ciphers with the sequential architecture, and then we eval-
uate hardware performance of these algorithms in ASIC. Our results show that the algorithms
implemented with the sequential architecture archives up to 60 % lower number of signal toggles
compared with the algorithms implemented with the parallel architecture.
In addition, we design a counter to reduce the glitch. The counter has a property that Hamming
Distance between the continuous two values is always 1. We use the counter to implement these
algorithms with the sequential architecture, and evaluate hardware performance in ASIC. Our
results show that the algorithms implemented with the sequential architecture using our counter
archives up to 60 % lower number of signal toggles compared with the algorithms implemented
with the sequential architecture.
A cryptographic circuit consists of FF and combinational logic circuit. The update functions of
the lightweight cryptographic algorithms consist of low-area consuming functions, such as XOR
and bitwise rotations. Therefore, FFs take dominant part of the area requirements. Since the up-
date function of PHOTON-160/36/36 consists of AES-based functions, the combinational logic
circuit is more complicated. Thus, the contribution of the combinational logic of the algorithm is
large. The internal state of Keccak is about 10 times larger than that of the lightweight crypto-
graphic algorithms. As all bits of the internal state are taken as the input to the update function,
the area requirements of the combinational logic circuit are large.
5.7 Conclusion
It is important to select a cryptographic algorithm taking into consideration of tradeos between
hardware performances. When low-area requirements and low-power consumption are required,
SPONGENT-160 is a good candidate. When high speed performance is required, Keccak can be
used under the condition that the power consumption and the area requirements can be allowed.
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The lightweight stream ciphers implemented with these hardware architectures can be used as
these algorithms achieves well-balanced hardware performance.
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Part IV
Design of Lightweight
Pseudorandom Number Generator

Chapter 6
Lightweight Pseudorandum Number
Generator
6.1 Introduction
PRNG is a key component for tag authentication protocols as well as cryptographic algo-
rithms. Previous studies make it cleared that security weakness of the tags caused from mainly
PRNG [68][45][78][49][44]. These results indicate that randomness of the output of PRNG is
important for RFID authentication protocols.
PRNGs for tag have been studied. Lopez et al. have focused on Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS)
PRNG and evaluated hardware performance on FPGA in the sense of area requirements and clock
cycles [65]. Katti et al. have proposed a PRNG based on linear congruent generator using ad-
dition, multiplication, and modular reduction [60]. AKARI, which is a lightweight PRNG using
addition and multiplication, has been developed, and hardware performance on ASIC have been
studied [71]. Mujahid, et al. have proposed a PRNG using bitwise right rotation, bitwise OR,
multiplication, and modulo addition [69]. They have evaluated hardware performance of their
proposed method on FPGA. M-Segui et al. have proposed a PRNG based on LRSR configured
with multiple polynomials that are selected by a physical source [94][95]. Chen et al. have pro-
posed multiple polynomial LFSR based PRNG [27].
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Since a tag is a small device, available hardware resources are quite limited. Using previously
proposed PRNGs for a tag means that two kinds of circuits are needed to be implemented in a tag.
One is a circuit for PRNG and the other is a circuit for the cryptographic algorithm. Therefore,
more hardware resources are required if this implementation methodology is adopted.
We deduce that sharing a cryptographic circuit to generate pseudorandom number and cipher-
text will achieve low area requirements of the tag. While PRNGs using a block cipher or a hash
function are standardized by NIST [79], it is predicted that much hardware resources are required
for implementation of NIST standardized PRNGs. These PRNGs cannot be realized by simply
implementing the cryptographic algorithm as derivation functions are needed.
In this chapter, we study a method to generate pseudorandom number using a cryptographic
algorithm that is a component of RFID authentication protocol. OMHSO protocol, which is a
privacy preserving RFID authentication protocol, is based on PRNG and hash function. Thus, we
focus on a pseudorandom number generation method using hash function for a tag.
6.2 Proposed Method
PRNG takes a seed, which is a secret data, as the input to the function and it returns pseudo-
random number [73]. The value of seed changes every time for the authentication to generate
dierent data. However, when we use a random number generator to generate the seed, additional
hardware resources are required for the random number generator. As the output of the hash
function changes drastically when the input to the hash function changes, we design a lightweight
pseudorandom number generator based on hash chain.
Our proposed lightweight pseudorandom number generator works as follows. The seed is taken
as the input to the hash function. The output of the hash function is divided into two parts. The first
part is used for updated seed. The second part is used for pseudorandom number and this part is
returned from the lightweight pseudorandom number generator. The following equations describe
an overview of the lightweight pseudorandom number generator. Here, H is a hash function.
H(Seed) = Updated Seed jjPseudorandom Number; (6.1)
Seed = Updated Seed: (6.2)
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This lightweight pseudorandom number generator enable for tags to generate pseudorandom
number using the circuit of a hash function. This lightweight pseudorandom number generator
does not require additional hardware components.
6.3 Evaluation
We evaluate the lightweight pseudorandom number generator from the viewpoint of the random-
ness and the security strength.
6.3.1 Experimental Evaluation
We have evaluated the randomness of the output of the lightweight pseudorandom number gener-
ator. We use NIST test suite [81] and Diehard test suite [30] since these test suites are widely used
on previous studies. These test suites are statistical tests to measure the randomness of the data.
6.3.1.1 NIST Test Suite
NIST test suite consists of 15 tests.
1. Frequency Test
Test target is the proportion of zeroes and ones for the entire sequence. This test checks whether
the number of ones and zeros in a sequence are approximately the same with the expected value
in a random data.
2. Frequency Test within a Block
Test target is the proportion of ones within M-bit blocks. This test checks whether frequency of
ones in an M-bit block is approximately M/2.
3. Runs Test
Test target is the total number of runs in the sequence. A run is an uninterrupted sequence of bits.
The test checks whether the number of runs of ones and zeros of various lengths is dierent from
the expected value in a random sequence.
4. Tests for the Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block
Test target is the longest run of ones within M-bit blocks. The test checks whether the length of
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the longest run of ones is dierent from the expected value in a random data.
5. Binary Matrix Rank Test
Test target is the rank of disjoint sub-matrices of the entire sequence. This test checks linear
dependency among fixed length substrings of the sequence.
6. Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test
Test target is the peak heights in the Discrete Fourier Transform of the sequence. The test checks
whether the value is dierent from the expected value in a random sequence.
7. Non-overlapping Template Matching Test
Test target is the number of occurrences of pre-specified target strings. The test checks production
of many occurrences of a given non-periodic pattern.
8. Overlapping Template Matching Test
Test target is the number of occurrences of pre-specified target strings. In the Non-overlapping
Template Matching Test, if the pattern is not found, the window slides one bit. On the other hand,
in the overlapping Template Matching Test, if the pattern is found, the window slides one bit.
9. Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test
Test target is the number of bits between matching patterns. The test checks whether the sequence
can be significantly compressed without loss of information.
10. Linear Complexity Test
Test target is the length of LFSR. The test checks whether the sequence is enough considered as
random.
11. Serial Test
Test target is the frequency of all possible overlapping m-bit patterns. The test checks whether the
number of occurrences of the patterns is approximately same with the expected value in a random
sequence.
12. Approximate Entropy Test
Test target is the frequency of all possible overlapping m-bit patterns. The test checks whether the
frequency of overlapping blocks is the same with the expected value in a random sequence.
13. Cumulative Sums Test
Test target is the sum of digits, which is adjusted to 1 and -1, in the sequence. The test checks
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whether the sum of the partial sequences is dierent from the expected value in a random se-
quence.
14. Random Excursions Test
Test target is the number of cycles in the sum of the partial sequences in a similar way in the Cu-
mulative Sums Test. The test checks whether the number of cycles is dierent from the expected
value in a random sequence.
15. Random Excursions Variant Test
Test target is the total number of times that a particular state visits the sum described in cumulative
sum test. The test checks deviations from the expected value in a random number.
The results of the tests are analyzed in two ways. One is the evaluation of proportion of the
blocks in the sequence that pass the test. The range of acceptable proportion is determined by three
sigma limit. The other is the evaluation of distribution of p-values used to check the uniformity.
A histogram is used on the evaluation. The interval between 0 and 1 is divided into 10 sub groups
in the histogram. The p-values that lie in the sub groups are counted. Then, the uniformity of the
p-values is determined by 2 test. When the significance level is under 1%, the test judges the
sequence can be considered to be uniformly distributed. The results of two kinds of analysis are
included in the output of the NIST test suite
6.3.1.2 Diehard Test Suite
Diehard test suite consists of 15 tests.
1. Birthday Spacing Test
This test chooses m birthdays in a year of n days and generates a list. The number of occurrence
of the value in the list is expected to be in poisson distribution.
2. Overlapping 5-permutation Test
This test treats the input data as a sequence of random integers and determines the ordering of
the consecutive five integers. Then, the number of each transition is counted. The variance of the
transitions is expected to be a normal distribution.
3. Binary Rank Test (3131, 3232, 68)
This test creates random binary matrices. The sizes of the matrices are 3131, 3232, and 68.
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The ranks of the matrices are calculated, and then the ranks are compared with expected value.
4. Bitstream Test
This test creates consecutive 20-bit letters and counts the number of missing of the letters which
do not appear in the bit sequence. The numbers of missing of the letters are expected to be a
normally distribution.
5. Overlapping Pairs Space Occupancy Test
This test creates consecutive 10-bit letters and counts the number of missing of the 2-letters which
do not appear in the bit sequence. The numbers of missing of the letters are expected to be a
normally distribution.
6. Overlapping Quadruples Sparse Occupancy Test
This test creates consecutive 5-bit letters and counts the number of missing of the 4-letters which
do not appear in the bit sequence. The numbers of missing of the letters are expected to be a
normally distribution.
7. DNA Test
This test creates 4-letters by 2-bit and counts the number of missing of the 4-letters which do not
appear in the bit sequence. The numbers of missing of the letters are expected to be a normally
distribution.
8. Count the 1s Test
This test focuses on the number of 1s appeared in the sequence. The sequences are generated by
cutting input data into 8-bit integers, then, count the numbers of 1s in the bytes. The five kinds of
letters are determined by the number of 1s in the bytes. Then, the distributions of the letters and
the bytes are compared.
9. Parking Lot Test
This test focuses on randomly park a car in a square of side 100. If an attempt to park a car causes
a crash, parking at a randomly chosen location is tried. This test counts the numbers of success to
park a car. The numbers of success are expected to be a normally distribution.
10. Minimum Distance Test
This test chooses random points and finds the minimum distance between all pairs of the points.
The square of the minimum distance is expected to be exponentially distributed.
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11. 3D Spheres Test
This test chooses random points in a cube and finds the smallest value of the cube in the sense of
radius. These values are expected to be exponentially distributed.
12. Squeeze Test
This test starts at k = 231 and finds number of iterations to reduce k to 1 by multiplying floating
integer. The numbers of iterations are compared with expected value.
13. Overlapping Sums Test
This test counts the sum of consecutive 100 integers. The sums are predicted to be a normal
distribution.
14. Runs Test
This test counts the number of up runs and down runs. Up runs mean that elements are increasing
in value consecutively. Down runs mean that elements are decreasing in value consecutively.
15. Craps Test
This test plays crap game and finds the number of wins and the number of throws needed for end
of the game. The numbers of win are predicted to be a normal distribution.
These tests return p-values. The Diehard test suite does not describe the level that the sequence
can be considered to be uniformly distributed. Therefore, we judge the sequence in a similar
way to the NIST test suite [100]. Namely, a histogram is used on the evaluation. The interval
between 0 and 1 is divided into 10 sub groups in the histogram. The p-values that lie in the sub
groups are counted. Then, the uniformity of the p-values is determined by using 2 test. Since the
significance level of NIST test suite is 1%, we set the significance level as 1%. When the 2 value
is less than 21.66, the sequence can be considered to be uniformly distributed
6.3.2 Data Setting
As these test suites require more than 106 binary sequence, we have generated 100 samples of
106 binary sequences using the lightweight pseudorandom number generator in accordance with
the use on the tag authentication protocol. According to our previous studies, it has been cleared
that the lightweight hash function SPONGENT-160 is a good candidate for a tag [77]. There-
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fore, as a cryptographic component of the lightweight pseudorandom number generator, we select
SPONGENT-160. We have generated a binary sequence according to the following steps. First,
an 80-bit seed is taken as the input to the lightweight hash function. Then, the lightweight hash
function generates 114-bit hash value and the hash value is divided into two parts. One is 80-bit
seed and the other is 64-bit pseudorandom number. The pseudorandom number is returned as
the output. The seed is used for the updated seed. These steps are repeated until desired number
of binary sequence is generated. The binary sequence data for the tests are generated using a C
program.
6.3.3 Evaluation Results on NIST Test Suite
The results are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 NIST test suite result summary
Test number Test name P-value (Pv) Proportion (Pr) Result
1 Frequency Test 0.851383 0.98 pass
2 Frequency Test within a Block 0.085587 1.00 pass
3 Runs Test 0.964295 1.00 pass
4 Tests for the Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block 0.319084 1.00 pass
5 Binary Matrix Rank Test 0.983453 0.99 pass
6 Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 0.514124 0.97 pass
7 Non-overlapping Template Matching Test 0.005762  Pv  0.996335 0.96  Pr  0.99 pass
8 Overlapping Template Matching Test 0.401199 0.99 pass
9 Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test 0.739918 0.98 pass
10 Linear Complexity Test 0.262249 0.99 pass
11 Serial Test 0.834146, 0.739918 0.97, 1.00 pass
12 Approximate Entropy Test 0.062821 0.99 pass
13 Cumulative Sums Test 0.202268, 0.275709 0.98 pass
14 Random Excursions Test 0.086458  Pv  0.900104 0.97  Pr  1.00 pass
15 Random Excursions Variant Test 0.001490  Pv  0.875539 0.97  Pr  1.00 pass
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6.3.4 Evaluation Results on Diehard Test Suite
The results are shown in Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. The distribution of p-value is shown in Table 6.3.
2 value of p-values and final result are shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.2 Diehard test result summary
Test number Test name P-value (Pv) Result
1 Birthday Spacing Test 0.374339  Pv  0.943770 pass
2 Overlapping 5-permutation Test 0.065337  Pv  0.114126 pass
3 Binary Rank Test 0.050749  Pv  0.908538 pass
4 Bitstream Test 0.03576  Pv  0.94034 pass
5 Overlapping Pairs Space Occupancy Test 0.0098  Pv  0.9378 pass
6 Overlapping Quadruples Sparse Occupancy Test 0.0761  Pv  0.9841 pass
7 DNA Test 0.0548  Pv  0.9479 pass
8 Count the 1’s Test 0.126291  Pv  0.997037 pass
9 Parking Lot Test 0.017844  Pv  0.962529 pass
10 Minimum Distance Test 0.477304 pass
11 3D Spheres Test 0.13528  Pv  0.93699 pass
12 Squeeze Test 0.574709 pass
13 Overlapping Sums Test 0.170076  Pv  0.978530 pass
14 Runs Test 0.879693, 0.73519 pass
15 Craps Test 0.137325 pass
6.3.5 Security Analysis
We have evaluated the security strength of the lightweight pseudorandom number generator. We
use the same settings that we have used in the randomness evaluation using NIST test suite and
Diehard test suite. Let seedi, H, and PRNi be the ith seed, the hash function, and the pseudoran-
dom number generated from seedi, respectively. By introducing these symbols, the lightweight
pseudorandom number generator is expressed by the following equation.
H(seedi) = seedi+1jjPRNi: (6.3)
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Table 6.3 Diehard test result summary
P-value range Observed percentage Expected percentage
0.0-0.1 2.8 10
0.1-0.2 12.03 10
0.2-0.3 8.8 10
0.3-0.4 8.8 10
0.4-0.5 12.97 10
0.5-0.6 10.65 10
0.6-0.7 9.72 10
0.7-0.8 14.35 10
0.8-0.9 8.8 10
0.9-1.0 11.11 10
Table 6.4 2 value of p-values and final result
2 value Final result
19.462 pass
We evaluate the security strength of the lightweight pseudorandom number generator under the
following assumptions. First, an attacker knows the pseudorandom number bits output from the
RFID tag. Second, the tag has a tamper resistant memory and the attacker cannot get data stored
in the memory. Third, the attacker has a simulator of the lightweight pseudorandom number
generator.
We describe an attack scenario to reveal the secret seed of the lightweight pseudorandom num-
ber generator. First, we calculate the output of the hash function when we input all patterns of
seeds by using the simulator. Since the bit length of the seed is 80-bit, the output patterns of
the hash function are 280. Second, in the set of the output patterns of the hash function, we find
280=264 = 216 patterns having the same 64-bit sequence with PRNi generated by the tag. This is
because that the probability of the 64-bit data matching with PRNi is 1=264. These patterns can
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be listed up since PRNi is public. Third, we calculate the output of the hash function when we
input above listed 216 patterns in the second step to the hash function. Finally, in the set of the
output patterns of the hash function, we search a pattern having the same sequence with PRNi+1
generated by the tag. When the pattern is found, a pattern of seeds selected in the first step is the
secret seed.
Nowwe evaluate the computational complexity to reveal the secret seed on the above mentioned
attack scenario. The computational complexity needed for the first step is 280 since we calculate
hash value when all input patterns are taken as the input to the hash function. The computational
complexity needed for the third step is 216 since we calculate hash value when 216 patterns having
the same sequence with PRNi generated by the tag are taken as the input to the hash function.
In the second step and final step, the hash function is not called. Therefore, total computational
complexity to reveal the secret seed in the above mentioned attack scenario is approximately
280 + 216  280. Thus, we deduce that the lightweight pseudorandom number generator supports
80-bit security strength under the condition that the seed is 80-bit and the pseudorandom number
is 64-bit. This security strength is equal to the seed length.
6.3.6 Area Evaluation
According to the evaluation results of the lightweight cryptographic algorithms in the sense of
area requirements in Chapter 5, the area requirements of the cryptographic circuit will be 6450 GE
when SPONGENT-160 and Grain-80, which is intended to generate pseudorandom numbers, are
implemented in the circuit. On the other hand, the area requirements of the cryptographic circuit
will be 2980 GE when SPONGENT-160 is used to generate both hash values and pseudorandom
numbers. Therefore, our proposed method achieves 53% less area requirements of the crypto-
graphic circuit compared with the cryptographic circuit including a hash function and a PRNG.
6.4 Conclusion
We have studied a lightweight pseudorandom number generator for a tag. To achieve low-area
requirements of the tag, we have designed a pseudorandom number generator based on a hash
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function that is used as a component of a tag authentication protocol. Namely, first, a seed is taken
as the input to a hash function. Then, the outputs of the hash function are divided into two parts.
One is the updated seed and the other is the pseudorandom number. Finally, the pseudorandom
numbers are returned from the lightweight pseudorandom number generator.
To check the randomness of the output of the lightweight pseudorandom number generator, we
have used NIST test suite and Diehard test suite. A binary sequence is generated by the lightweight
pseudorandom number generator under the following conditions. As the hash function, we have
selected lightweight hash function SPONGENT-160. Seed length is 80-bit and length of pseu-
dorandom number is 64-bit. The binary sequence generated by the lightweight pseudorandom
number generator successfully passes all tests. Thus, we deduce that the output of the lightweight
pseudorandom number generator can be thought uniformly distributed. We have also analyzed
the security strength of the lightweight pseudorandom number generator and we deduce that the
lightweight pseudorandom number generator achieves the same security strength with the seed
size.
To generate pseudorandom number, some designated pseudorandom number generator have
been proposed. NIST has announced PRNGs using a hash function or a block cipher. To realize
the NIST method, additional components such as an expansion function are required to generate
a long sequence of pseudorandom bits. On the other hand, our proposed method does not require
additional components such as an expansion function, as the bit length of the pseudorandom num-
ber is not long for RFID tags. Therefore, our proposed method achieves low area requirements.
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Design and Evaluation of Secure
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Chapter 7
Fully Integrated Passive UHF RFID
Tag for Hash-Based Mutual
Authentication Protocol
Publication Data
Shugo Mikami, Dai Watanabe, Yang Li, and Kazuo Sakiyama, “Fully Integrated Passive UHF
RFID Tag for Hash-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol,” The Scientific World Journal, Hin-
dawi, Volume 2015 (2015), Article ID 498610, 11 pages, Aug., 2015.
7.1 Introduction
To overcome privacy and security issues, privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocols based
on cryptographic algorithms have been developed [90][2][99][31]. OSK protocol is one of the
protocols based on hash functions [88][89]. An improved version of OSK protocol, which is
called OMHSO protocol, has been developed [55].
Since cryptographic components, which form a building block of the protocols, increase power
consumption and area requirements of the tag, hardware performance of the cryptographic mod-
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ules or the digital processing block that runs a part of the authentication process based on crypto-
graphic algorithms have been studied. ASIC implementation results of lightweight cryptographic
algorithms have been discussed [16][58][43]. In [105], FPGA implementation results of the dig-
ital processing block that executes a hash-based challenge-response protocol have been studied.
In [1], implementation results of OSK protocol on an IC card have been studied. In [36], ASIC
implementation results of the digital processing block including AES [80] and Grain [7][54] have
been studied. In [91], ASIC implementation results of CRYPTOGPS including lightweight block
cipher PRESENT [21] have been studied.
In industry, some semiconductor manufacturers produce RFID tags with cryptographic compo-
nents. ORIDAO produces a secured EPC Gen2 chip including 192-bit hash function [87]. NXP
semiconductors sells MIFARE*1 DESFire*2 EV1 using block cipher 3DES [86].
In [72], Martin et al. have focused on two lightweight mutual authentication protocols. These
protocols are based on a PRNG and simple functions such as rotation operation. They have de-
signed a digital circuit including the PRNG, registers, and control logic. They have synthesized
the circuit and evaluated hardware performance of the circuit in the sense of area requirements,
power, and throughput. In [64], Liu et al. have proposed a lightweight mutual authentication
protocol. The protocol requires a random number generator and a LFSR. They have designed
a digital circuit including the LFSR and control logic. They have synthesized the circuit and
evaluated hardware performance of the circuit in the sense of area requirements and power by
performing a post-layout simulation.
They have implemented the digital circuit and have evaluated hardware performance of the dig-
ital circuit in the sense of area requirements and power consumption by performing a simulation.
However, they have not carried out a silicon proof of the circuit and have not evaluated hardware
performance of a tag including an antenna that is attached to the circuit to communicate over
the air with a reader. In other words, feasibility of the protocol from the viewpoint of hardware
implementation has not been cleared.
Implementation and evaluation of the whole tag, which runs the authentication process, have not
*1 MIFARE is a registered trademark of NXP Semiconductors.
*2 DESFire is a registered trademark of NXP Semiconductors.
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been studied. An antenna, an analog front end, and a digital processing block should be integrated
in the tag. It is very important to evaluate the whole tag since these modules are required to run
the whole authentication process and these modules operate in a mutually coupled manner.
To run the authentication protocol on the tag, additional components such as an analog front
end, SRAM, EEPROM, and an antenna are required. Therefore, we design a completely assem-
bled tag including not only a digital circuit but also above mentioned components. We have carried
out a full silicon proof of the tag. The silicon proof of the tag enables us to evaluate hardware
performance of the tag in the sense of the maximum read distance and the operating time. These
metrics have a strong impact on the usability of the tag.
[66] has introduced an implementation result of a passive UHF RFID tag chip that runs OMHSO
protocol. The feasibility of the chip has been evaluated under the condition that the RF signal is
generated by an RF signal generator. As the cryptographic component, SPONGENT-160 has been
implemented.
7.2 Specification of a Fully Integrated Passive Tag
7.2.1 Overview
We implement a fully integrated passive UHF RFID tag that runs OMHSO protocol in this paper.
We design a single chip including the RF front end and the digital processing block. If these
two kinds of units are implemented separately on the tag, the power consumption of the tag is
predicted to be large since an electric current is required to make to flow between the chips.
To reduce the electric current between the analog part and the digital part, we have decided to
integrate the analog front end and the digital processing block in a single chip. Our tag has the
ability to communicate with a reader on the market without extra equipment. As the cryptographic
component, we implement not only SPONGENT-160 but also Keccak.
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7.2.2 Hash Function
We select SPONGENT-160 that achieves well-balanced performance in Chapter 5. NIST shows
a guidance to migrate to the use of stronger cryptographic algorithms [82]. In the guidance,
migration to 128-bit security strength is required. Thus, we also choose newly selected NIST
standard hash function Keccak to support strong security strength.
To run the protocol on a tag, three kinds of hash functions and a random number generator are
required. However, separate implementation of these components will result in large area cost
of the tag and the tag will consume much power since the power consumption of the circuit is
generally proportional to the area requirements of the circuit.
To reduce cost of the tag, we decided to use a minimum cryptographic component that per-
forms the necessary functions. For three hash functions, we decided to use single hash function
with dierent padding manners to realize dierent hash calculations. For a random number gen-
erator, we use the lightweight pseudorandom number generator in Chapter 6. Therefore, we only
implement single hash function and use it for three hash value calculations and a pseudorandom
number generation.
7.2.3 Memory
Memory is an important component for implementation of the tag.
7.2.3.1 SRAM
Since SRAM cannot save the written data when the power supply is lost, SRAM is mainly used
for the temporary storage of data. Two additional transistors called access transistors are used to
control the access to a cell. The access to the cell is enabled by the word line that is connected
to the access transistors. The cell is connected to the bit lines through the access transistors. The
bit lines transfer data when both read access and write access occurs. When read access occurs,
voltage level of the bit lines are driven high and low by the cell. When write access occurs, voltage
level of the bit lines are driven high and low by data that is written to the cell.
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7.2.3.2 EEPROM
The principle of EEPROM is based on a capacitor that stores electric charge for a long time.
The main component of EEPROM is a field eect transistor. An additional gate exists between
the control gate of the field eect transistor and the silicon. The gate is located near the carrier
material and is not connected to external power supply. The gate, which is called floating gate, is
charged or discharged from the carrier material using tunnel eect. Therefore, a large potential
dierence should exist between the gate and the carrier material.
Current between source and drain is controlled by the stored charge at the floating gate. When
an electric current flows between the source and drain, 1 is stored in the cell. When an electric
current does not flow, 0 is stored in the cell. When writing 0 or 1 to a cell, a high voltage is applied
to the control gate to use tunnel eect.
The number of write operation is limited. As electrons are captured by tunneling eect with the
write operation, electrons are gradually trapped on the floating gate. Since the trapped electrons
generate the electric field in the floating gate, this electric field lowers the threshold voltage be-
tween 0 and 1. After sucient number of write operation, the dierence between 0 and 1 becomes
too small to identify. Thus, read operation failure occurs.
7.2.4 Implementation Details
In this section, we describe the functionality and the characteristics of the blocks in the tag
chip. Figure. 7.1 shows the functional blocks of the single chip. We stress here that while we
have implemented SPONGENT-160 only in the hash function block in [66], we implement both
SPONGENT-160 and Keccak in the hash function block.
The tag chip consists of the analog part and the digital part. The analog part consists of the
analog power block and the analog clock block. The analog power block extracts the energy from
the RF field and supplies the power for all the rest of the blocks. This block has buer capacitors.
This block generates two supply voltages of 1.8 V and 3.3 V.
The analog clock block generates clock signals needed in the digital processing block. This
block has the oscillator and generates 12.8 MHz clock signal that is the source of all the clock
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Figure. 7.1 Block diagram of the single chip
　　　
signals. This block also performs the demodulation/modulation and power on reset. The input
supply voltage of this block is 1.8 V.
The digital part consists of the interface block, the comparator block, the finite state machine
block, the hash function block, the memory controller block, the volatile memory, and the non-
volatile memory. The interface block generates the clock signals from 12.8 MHz clock signal that
is taken as the input to the block. The circuit in this block allows for lowering the clock frequency
down to 800 kHz, 6.4 MHz, and 40 kHz. The input supply voltage of this block is 1.8 V. In
addition, the interface block controls the communication between the analog part and the digital
part. The response is generated in a module in this block. In the module, 40 kHz clock signal is
used to generate the response. To simplify Figure. 7.1, this clock signal is not shown.
The comparator block compares the data such as the output of the hash function block, and the
data sent from the server. This block operates with 800 kHz clock signal and the input supply
voltage is 1.8 V.
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The finite state machine block controls the flow of OMHSO protocol. The flow consists of the
following 8 steps: loading tag state and seed for PRNG from EEPROM to SRAM, loading key
from EEPROM to SRAM, calculation of  and  with hash function, calculation of Z0 with hash
function, comparing Z and Z0, calculation of new key with hash function, EEPROM block writing
for new key, and EEPROM block writing for new seed. This block operates with 800 kHz clock
signal and the input supply voltage is 1.8 V.
The volatile memory is a 128-byte SRAM and is used to save temporal data such as the data
received from the server, the secret data loaded from the non-volatile memory, and the output of
the hash function block. The data width of SRAM is 8-bit to achieve low-power consumption of
the tag. This block operates with 800 kHz clock signal and the input supply voltage is 1.8 V.
The hash function block calculates the hash values of the input data. The hash functions imple-
mented on this block are SPONGENT-160 and Keccak. These algorithms are switched and used.
This block operates with 800 kHz clock signal and the input supply voltage is 1.8 V.
The interface of the hash function module is based on SRAM with 8-bit data width. Namely,
the input data is cut into 8-bit blocks and the blocks are taken as an input to the hash function
module one by one. Similarly, hash value is cut into 8-bit blocks and the blocks are returned from
the hash function module one by one.
The hash function module has FFs called state to store the intermediate data. After the state is
initialized with 0, the input blocks are xored into a part of the state interleaved with the application
of the permutation function of SPONGENT-160 or Keccak. At the end of every clock, the state
is updated with the output of the permutation function. After absorbing all the input blocks, hash
value is produced. A part of the state is returned as the hash block interleaved with the application
of the permutation function. The state is updated continuously by the permutation function until
desired bits of the hash value are returned.
The memory controller block communicates with SRAM and EEPROM for the data transfer.
This block controls read/write operands, the address, and the data. This block operates with
800 kHz clock signal and the input supply voltage is 1.8 V.
Finally, the non-volatile memory is a 1-KByte EEPROM and is used to save the secret keys
and the seed. The input supply voltage is 3.3 V. This block operates with 6.4 MHz clock signal.
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Additional information about the blocks except the hash function block is described in [66].
7.2.5 Hardware Architecture of SPONGENT-160
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Figure. 7.2 Hardware architecutre of SPONGENT160 in the hash function block
　　　
Figure. 7.2 shows the hardware architecture of SPONGENT-160 in the hash function block.
R-buf is a 16-bit buer register to store message blocks and hash value blocks. R-state is a 176-bit
register to save the internal state. Data stored in R-state is taken as an input to the permutation.
R-cl is a 7-bit register to update the round constant.
At the beginning of the initialization process, the registers are initialized with 0. After a 16-bit
message block is loaded to R-buf, the absorbing process begins. At the end of every clock in the
absorbing process, R-state register is updated with the output of the permutation. In the squeezing
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process, hash value is produced. 16-bit of R-state is output as the hash block. Since an 8-bit data
path is used, the 16-bit hash block is stored in R-buf. Then the hash value is output from R-buf.
Two clock cycles are needed to output the hash block.
7.2.6 Hardware Architecture of Keccak
　　　
R_state
permutation
iota
output
input
8-bit
theta_0
8-bit
theta_1
theta_63
pi_1
cl_gen
R_cl
rho
pi_21
pi_0
xi_0
xi_1
xi_63
　　　
Figure. 7.3 Hardware architecture of Keccak in the hash function block
　　　
Figure. 7.3 shows the hardware architecture of Keccak in the hash function block. R-state is
a 1600-bit register to save the internal state. Data stored in R-state is taken as an input to the
permutation. R-cl is a 7-bit register to update the round constant.
At the beginning of the initialization process, the registers are initialized with 0. After a message
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block is loaded to R-state, the absorbing process begins. At the end of every clock in the absorbing
process, R-state register is updated with the output of the permutation. In the squeezing phase,
hash value is produced. A part of R-state is output as the hash value. Since an 8-bit data path is
used, the hash value is stored in the R-state and is output from the R-state.
Compared with the hardware architecture of SPONGENT-160, the hardware architecture of
Keccak does not have R-buf. This dierence is caused by the size of the rate. Since SPONGENT-
160 has 16-bit rate, the number of the message block and the hash value block are large. Therefore,
the permutation is applied to the internal state repeatedly interleaved with message block inputs
and hash block outputs. On the other hand, since Keccak has more than 160-bit rate, the permu-
tation is applied to the internal state only once to generate 160-bit hash value. Thus, the R-state is
used to store the hash value after the permutation.
7.3 Hardware Evaluation Using the Actual Tag
In this section, we show evaluation results of the tag in terms of cost, speed, power, and the com-
munication distance. As two hash functions can be switched and used, this mechanism enables us
to evaluate the performance of the tag depending on the cryptographic hash functions.
7.3.1 Cost Evaluation
The whole RFID tag chip is fabricated in a 180 m CMOS process. Figure. 7.4 shows the photo-
graph of the manufactured RFID tag chip. As shown in Figure. 7.4, the tag chip includes the ana-
log power block, the analog clock block, the cryptographic block, 128-byte SRAM, and 1-Kbyte
EEPROM. The RFID tag chip size is 2.5 mm  2.5 mm. The reason for selecting a relatively large
chip size is due to the number of I/O pins required for the performance evaluation.
Table 7.1 shows the area requirements of the cryptographic block in the RFID tag chip. The
results are based on the synthesis result and shown in both area and GE manner. The area re-
quirements of the interface module are due to the functionalities of the clock divider, the reader
command decoder, and the signal formation of the tag response. The area requirements of the
cryptographic block occupied with SPONGENT-160 are 2.9 kGE. The area requirements of the
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Figure. 7.4 Micrograph of the RFID tag chip
　　　
cryptographic block occupied with Keccak are 32.4 kGE.
Table 7.2 shows the area requirements of the each block in the layout of the RFID tag chip. The
analog power block takes the largest portion of the area. Since the analog power block has buer
capacitors, these capacitors take a large portion of the area. EEPROM also takes a large portion
of the area. However, EEPROM that we used has much larger memory size than the required
memory size needed to run the authentication protocol.
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Table 7.1 Area and GE of modules in the cryptographic block after synthesis
Component Area GE
(m2)
Interface 50340 5734
SPONGENT-160 (Hash 1) 25809 2940
Keccak (Hash 2) 284641 32419
Others 11885 1353
Total 372675 42446
Table 7.2 Area of blocks on the RFID tag chip after layout
Component Area
(m2)
Analog Power Block 811915.6
Analog Clock Block 150955.7
Cryptographic Block 372675
Volatile Memory (SRAM) 39372.1
Non-Volatile Memory (EEPROM) 398950
Total 1773868.4
7.3.2 Speed Evaluation
Table 7.3 shows the operating time for each step of OMHSO protocol using SPONGENT-160 or
Keccak. When SPONGENT-160 is used, the tag chip generates the first response to the reader
within 5 ms. The tag chip finishes all the operations within 20 ms. The hash calculations and the
EEPROM block write operations take large part of the time.
Similarly, when Keccak is used, the tag chip generates the first response to the reader within
0.3 ms. The tag chip finishes all the operations within 10 ms. The EEPROM block write opera-
tions take large part of the time.
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Table 7.3 Time evaluation of OMHSO protocol using SPONGENT-160 or Keccak on the tag.
The results using SPONGENT-160 are already mentioned in [66].
Step Process Time Time Dierence of Time
(ms) (ms) (ms)
Hash function SPONGENT-160 Keccak -
(1) Load tag state and seed for PRNG
from EEPROM to SRAM 0.02 0.02 0
(2) Load key from EEPROM to SRAM 0.02 0.02 0
(3) Calculate  and  with Hash function 4.52 0.23 4.29
(4) Calculate Z0 with Hash function 2.94 0.14 2.8
(5) Compare Z with Z0 0.06 0.06 0
(6) Calculate new key with Hash function 2.04 0.11 1.9
(7) EEPROM block write for new key 4.33 4.33 0
(8) EEPROM block write for new seed 4.33 4.33 0
Total 18.26 9.24 9.02
Next, we evaluate the time needed to run the whole process of OMHSO protocol including
communication between the tag and a reader. The length of Tari is 25 s in the wireless commu-
nication between the tag and the reader. The average data rate for the reader-to-tag communication
is 27 kbps. The average data rate for the tag-to-reader communication is 95 kbps. The tag and
the reader send 224-bit data each other. Thus the predicted time needed to exchange the data is
10.7 ms in total.
Therefore, the time required to complete OMHSO protocol using SPONGENT-160 is less than
30 ms. Similarly, the time required to complete OMHSO protocol using Keccak is less than 20 ms.
The tag using Keccak finishes authentication process about 9 ms faster than the tag using
SPONGENT-160. Since the time required for the processes without hash calculation are inde-
pendent from the hash functions, the dierence of the time results from the hash calculations.
While the number of clock cycles needed for the cryptographic process of Keccak are smaller
than that of SPONGENT-160, the cryptographic process of Keccak is more complex than that
of SPONGENT-160. As shown in Section 7.3.1, the area requirements of SPONGENT-160 are
smaller than that of Keccak. Therefore, there is a trade-o between the area requirements and the
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time.
7.3.3 Power Evaluation
7.3.3.1 Simulated Power Consumption after Layout
We show the average power consumption of the cryptographic block based on a post-layout sim-
ulation. The baseband input signal is prepared in the simulation and is taken as the input to the
cryptographic block. The post-layout netlist and the gates information are used to generate the
signal toggle information. Based on these power consumption profiles, the average power con-
sumption for each step of OMHSO protocol is evaluated.
Table 7.4 Simulated power consumption of the cryptographic block using SPONGENT-160 (W)
Step (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Interface 157.0 155.0 154.0 154.0 153.0 153.0 153.0 153.0
SPONGENT-160 19.4 19.4 39.5 39.5 19.8 39.5 19.4 19.4
Keccak 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
Others 83.5 84.5 25.4 26.4 88.0 26.4 25.5 25.5
Total 261.0 260.0 220.0 221.0 262.0 220.0 199.0 199.0
Table 7.5 Simulated power consumption of the cryptographic block using Keccak (W)
State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Interface 148.0 146.0 147.0 147.0 147.0 148.0 145.0 144.0
SPONGENT-160 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Keccak 132.0 132.0 315.0 283.0 130.0 340.0 130.0 130.0
Others 76.9 77.9 48.9 80.9 80.9 47.9 18.9 19.9
Total 357.0 356.0 511.0 479.0 358.0 536.0 294.0 294.0
Table 7.4 shows the average power consumption of the cryptographic block using SPONGENT-
160. Similarly, Table 7.5 shows the average power consumption of the cryptographic block using
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Keccak. In Tables 7.4 and 7.5, step is the same as the one used on Table 7.3. In this simulation,
the power consumption of SRAM and EEPROM is not included since the power consumption of
these components cannot be evaluated correctly by the same method.
In Tables 7.4 and 7.5, the hash function module is active in Steps (3), (4), and (6). When the
hash function module is active, the hash function module consumes about double or three times
of power. The interface module, which includes the clock divider, constantly consumes about
150 W power. The interface module takes the largest part of the power consumption of the
cryptographic block when SPONGENT-160 is used. On the other hand, when Keccak is used, the
hash function module takes the largest part of the power consumption of the cryptographic block.
7.3.3.2 Power Consumption of the Chip with RF-based Power Supply
In this section, we show evaluation results of the tag in terms of power consumption of the digital
processing block including SRAM and EEPROM. We deduce that it is very important to use a
single tag chip for evaluation since the performance of the tag chips are individually dierent.
Therefore, we use the evaluation board of the chip to switch and use the hash functions on a single
tag chip.
Next, we describe the evaluation methodology. Figure. 7.5 shows the evaluation system of
the RFID tag chip using the evaluation board. The board has a debug functionality. The debug
functionality enables us to observe the voltage via the debug pins. The functionality is set by a
dip switch on the board.
There are two methods to supply power to the evaluation board: an external stable power supply
and RF-based power supply. Originally, a passive tag harvests the necessary power from the RF
field. To evaluate the performance of the tag under actual operating conditions, we decided to
supply power to the chip from the RF field. We connect the antenna that is connected to an SMA
connector on the evaluation board via cable. We attach the cable to the height adjustment device so
that the distance between the antenna and the reader is variable. The data communicated between
the reader and the tag are controlled on PC. The signal level is set to 24 dBm (250 mW) for the
output of the reader.
For power evaluation of the digital processing block including SRAM, we use an oscilloscope
to measure the voltage drop in the 1.8 V power supply line. We add several resistors in the 1.8
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Figure. 7.5 Power evaluation system of RFID tag chip
　　　
V power supply line, which is connected to the digital processing block, to measure the voltage
drop. Next, we calculate the electric current by dividing the voltage drop by the resistance. Then,
we evaluate the power consumption of the digital processing block by multiplying the calculated
electric current and the voltage after the resistor.
In Figure. 7.6, we plot the peak power consumption of the digital processing block using
SPONGENT-160 versus the resistance. Similarly, Figure. 7.7 shows the peak power consump-
tion of the digital processing block using Keccak versus the resistance.
Now we evaluate the real peak power consumption of the digital processing block with these
figures. From these figures, it seems that there is a linear relationship between the power con-
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Figure. 7.6 Peak power consumption of the digital processing block using SPONGENT-160
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Figure. 7.7 Peak power consumption of the digital processing block using Keccak
sumption and the resistance. Usually the tag runs OMHSO protocol without the resistors. Thus,
the actual power consumption of the block is the power that is measured under the condition that
the added resistor will be 0 
. The actual values are equal to the intercepts of Figures. 7.6 and
7.7. The intercepts of Figures. 7.6 and 7.7 are 1.6 mW and 14.3 mW, respectively.
In the same way, we evaluate the power consumption of EEPROM during the authentication
process is executed. In this case, we measure the voltage drop in the 3.3 V power supply line. The
peak power consumption of EEPROM is 3.5 mW.
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7.3.4 Communication Distance Evaluation
In this section, we show evaluation results of the maximum read distance between the tag and the
reader. We first show our evaluation methodology. Similar to the power evaluation, we use the
evaluation system shown in Figure. 7.5. On this evaluation, we turn o the debug functionality
and remove the resistor added in the power supply line since there is no need to measure the
voltage drop.
We first set the distance between the reader and the antenna. Then the tag runs OMHSO proto-
col 50 times repeatedly and we count the number of successes. To stabilize the wireless communi-
cation between a tag and a reader, a commercial reader sends the command repeatedly depending
on the application or communication environment of the tag. Thus, we decided to judge whether
the communication is successful or unsuccessful by sending the command several times. The
success probability is calculated by dividing the number of the successes by the number of the
execution of the protocol.
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Figure. 7.8 The communication distance between the tag and a reader
　　　
We plot the communication distance and the success probability of the communication of each
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hash function in Figure. 7.8. The maximum read distance of the tag using SPONGENT-160 is
1.5 cm longer than that of the tag using Keccak.
However, it remains the possibility of error in the measured maximum read distance according
to the electromagnetic wave conditions such as the reflected waves. To evaluate the error, we re-
peatedly performed the above mentioned experiment. We focus on the distance where the success
probability is 0 and it is close to 0. Our experimental results show that the number of the successes
varies at the distance where the success probability is close to 0. On the other hand, the number
of the successes are always 0 where the success probability is 0.
7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Impact of Non-Volatile Memory
As described in Section 7.3.3, the peak power consumption of EEPROM is larger than that of
the digital processing block using SPONGENT-160. Thus, when the lightweight hash function is
used, the power consumption of EEPROM is a bottleneck.
Recently, low-power memories such as FRAM are being developed [92]. The principle of
FRAM is based on the ferroelectric eort that is a capability of a material to retain an electrical
polarization even if electric field is absent. The polarization is generated by the alignment of an
electric dipole in the lattice of the ferroelectric material and is caused by the electric field that is
stronger than the coercive force of the ferroelectric material. When an opposite electric field is
applied to the ferroelectric material, the opposite alignment of an electric dipole is generated. The
electric dipole takes one of two stable states and the stable states are saved after the electric field
is removed. These states indicate 0 or 1.
FRAM is superior to EEPROM in terms of power consumption and speed performance. In
the report [93], while EEPROM takes 5100 s for write operation, FRAM takes 137 s. While
EEPROM consumes about 470 W, FRAM consumes only 4.6 W. According to [37], while the
write voltage of EEPROM is 12 V, the write voltage of FRAM is 2 V. In addition, the lifetime of
EEPROM in the sense of the number of possible write operation is limited to 106. On the other
hand, the lifetime of FRAM in the sense of the number of possible write operation is 1012.
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In the future, when these memories will be used widely and implemented in tags, the power
consumed by modules except the cryptographic module is predicted to be smaller. Thus, these
memories will extend the maximum read distance when the lightweight cryptographic algorithm
is used.
7.4.2 Usability of FPGA
To discuss the practicality of FPGA on the tag implementation, we compare FPGA and ASIC
implementation results of the same circuits. From our ASIC implementation results, it has been
cleared that there is a linear relationship between the power consumption of the circuit and the
number of signal toggles. To evaluate the number of signal toggles, we have simulated the cir-
cuits’ behavior for 100 random test vectors and have generated VCD files. We have calculated a
population mean and a population standard by 99 % reliable section, and then we have predicted
the number of signal toggles by three sigma limit. From these experimental results, the power
consumption of the circuit can be evaluated by a liner equation.
Power = 0:2848  x; (7.1)
where, x is the number of signal toggles. Order of the power is W.
The circuits on FPGA consume power of mW order operating at 24 MHz [59]. It is predicted
that the circuits on FPGA still consume power of mW order operating at 100 kHz since there is
a linear relationship between the power and the clock frequency. Therefore, it seems dicult to
use FPGA on the tag at the moment. When the power consumption of FPGA will be low in the
future, FPGA will be integrated in a tag.
On the other hand, according to the results in Chapter 5, tendency of the evaluation results
on FPGA are similar to the evaluation results on ASIC. Therefore, FPGA is useful to compare
hardware performance of the cryptographic algorithms roughly and relatively.
7.4.3 Impact of Cryptographic Algorithm
The power consumption of the cryptographic block using SPONGENT-160 and Keccak are
262 W and 534 W, respectively. The cryptographic block using Keccak consumes two times
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larger power compared with the one using SPONGENT-160. According to the equation (3.44),
the maximum read distance of the tag inversely proportional to the square root of the power
consumption. Therefore, the maximum read distance of the tag using Keccak is predicted to be
0.875 times shorter than that of the tag using SPONGENT-160. From the evaluation results of
the tag, the maximum read distance of the tag using SPONGENT-160 and Keccak are 10 cm
and 8.5 cm, respectively. Thus, we deduce that there is not much dierence in the sense of the
maximum read distance of the tag.
We have designed a passive tag with the analog power block that has enough capacity to supply
power to the circuit absolutely. When we use smaller analog power block, the impact of the
cryptographic block in the sense of power consumption will become larger. Then the lightweight
cryptographic algorithm will have advantage.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we design, implement, and evaluate performance of a fully integrated passive
UHF RFID tag that runs a privacy preserving authentication protocol based on hash functions.
We design a single chip including the RF front end and the digital processing block. We choose
SPONGENT-160 and Keccak. We implement all modules that are needed to run the whole authen-
tication process including SRAM and EEPROM. Our evaluation results show that the maximum
read distance is 10 cm when SPONGENT-160 is used. The time required for the first response of
the tag including a hash calculation is less than 5 ms and the authentication is completed within
30 ms. The area requirements of the cryptographic block are 10 kGE. The average power con-
sumption of the cryptographic block is 260 Wwhen the hash function is active.
When Keccak is used, the maximum read distance is 8.5 cm. The time required for the first
response of the tag including a hash calculation is less than 0.3 ms and the authentication is
completed within 20 ms. The area requirements of the cryptographic block are about 39.4 kGE.
The average power consumption of the cryptographic block is 536 W when the hash function
is active. From our evaluation results, the RFID mutual authentication protocol based on a hash
function is feasible for the passive UHF RFID tag.
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Part VI
Conclusion

Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks and Future
Research Direction
Conclusion
An RFID tag can be a key device in IoT system to collect physical information. The tag will be
attached to items or owned by people. Since the tag returns a response whenever the tag receives
a query from a reader, there are security and privacy issues on the tag. To overcome these issues,
tag authentication protocols have been developed. The goal of this thesis has been to construct a
design methodology of a secure RFID tag implementation. Specifically, we aim to make it dicult
for an attacker to trace a tag by designing, implementing, and evaluating the tag that can run the
authentication protocol based on a cryptographic algorithm.
In Part III, we have discussed hardware architecture and cryptographic algorithms for a tag.
Concretely, we have focused on hash functions and stream ciphers, which are widely used for
tag authentication protocols, and we have evaluated hardware performance. Operating time, area
requirements, and power consumption are important evaluation metrics for a tag. Since the oper-
ating time needed for cryptographic process largely depends on hardware architecture, we have
studied hardware architecture for the tag from a viewpoint of the operating time. Our results
show that the parallel architecture is suitable for the hash functions. Both the parallel architecture
and the sequential architecture are suitable for the stream ciphers. Then, we have implemented
– 125 –
the hash functions and the stream ciphers using the above mentioned hardware architecture, and
we have evaluated hardware performance. From our evaluation results, when low-area require-
ments and low-power consumption are required, SPONGENT-160 is a good candidate. When
high speed performance is required, Keccak can be used for a tag under the condition that the
power consumption of the algorithm is allowed. In conclusion of Part III, the lightweight crypto-
graphic algorithm contributes for a tag when low-area requirements and low-power consumption
are required while it takes time for the cryptographic process. On the contrary, the standard cryp-
tographic algorithm contributes for a tag when high speed performance is required while it takes
much area requirements and consumes power.
In Part IV, we have discussed a lightweight pseudorandom number generator for a tag. In order
to use a cryptographic circuit on the tag eectively, the cryptographic circuit should be used to
generate pseudorandom number. Hence, we have proposed a lightweight pseudorandom number
generator using a hash function. Our method is based on the hash chain, and the output of the
hash function is divided into the updated seed and the pseudorandom number. Our evaluation
results show that the pseudorandom number generated by our method passes NIST test suite and
Diehard test suite. In conclusion of Part IV, the lightweight pseudorandom number generator we
have proposed contributes for the security enhancement of the tag.
In Part V, we have designed, implemented, and evaluated a tag that runs the authentication
protocol based on a cryptographic algorithm. We have designed a single chip including the analog
front end block and the digital processing block. As the cryptographic algorithm, we have used
SPONEGNT-160 and Keccak. We have done a silicon proof of the chip, and we have attached
the antenna to the chip. Our evaluation results show that the tag has operated correctly. When
SPONGENT-160 is activated, the maximum read distance of the tag, the power consumption,
and the operating time for the authentication process are 10 cm, 260W, and 30 ms, respectively.
When Keccak is activated, the maximum read distance of the tag, the power consumption, and
the operating time for the authentication process are 8.5 cm, 534W, and 20 ms, respectively.
In conclusion of Part V, the feasibility of the privacy preserving authentication protocol based on
cryptographic algorithms is demonstrated. In addition, it is verified that the standard cryptographic
algorithm works on the tag.
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Future work
Future research direction should include developing a secure RFID tag that has resistance
against side channel attacks. In fact, even if the tag runs the authentication protocol, which up-
dates a secret key every time when the tag is authenticated, the secret key can be revealed. If
immediately detach the tag from the reader after the tag finishes the cryptographic process and
sends the response to the reader, the secret key is not updated. This is because the tag cannot
receive power from the reader to rewrite the secret key in the memory. Therefore, the secret key
is used to generate tag’s response repeatedly. Thus, the secret key in the tag can be revealed by
side channel attack such as dierential electromagnetic analysis.
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